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Abstract	  	  	  	  This	  project	  analyzes	  the	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  presidential	  policy-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  	  I	  will	  ultimately	  present	  a	  set	  of	  four	  components	  that	  I	  argue	  played	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  détente	  at	  the	  time	  he	  did.	  The	  four	  consequential	  factors	  include	  the	  following:	  First,	  domestic	  conditions	  exist	  in	  which	  the	  general	  public	  is	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  policy.	  	  Second,	  the	  existing	  international	  conditions	  allow	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Third,	  when	  a	  president	  is	  personally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  “informal	  powers”	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  take	  leadership	  over	  public	  opinion.	  And	  fourth,	  when	  a	  president	  assumes	  office	  at	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  a	  previous	  “regime”	  of	  foreign	  policy	  is	  failing.	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  1	  
Introduction	  	  	  	  
By	  the	  time	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  was	  sworn	  into	  office	  in	  1969,	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	  been	  well	  underway	  for	  over	  20	  years.	  At	  this	  time,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  known	  as	  the	  world’s	  “great	  power”	  countries,	  seemingly	  had	  two	  choices:	  Either	  they	  could	  continue	  intimidation	  tactics	  and	  risk	  an	  all-­‐out	  nuclear	  war,	  or	  the	  two	  countries	  could	  simply	  agree	  to	  disagree	  and	  work	  together	  on	  finding	  common	  ground	  in	  areas	  of	  mutual	  interest.	  Nixon	  and	  his	  then	  National	  Security	  Advisor,	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  chose	  the	  latter	  strategy.	  They	  called	  this	  calming	  of	  tensions	  détente.	  The	  Nixon	  administration’s	  approach	  to	  détente,	  primarily	  led	  and	  influenced	  by	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  war	  and	  peace	  in	  one	  region.	  Rather,	  in	  the	  most	  direct	  sense,	  it	  was	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  global	  order.	  Furthermore,	  the	  competing	  theories	  about	  the	  United	  States’	  policy	  of	  détente	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  how	  we	  see	  and	  approach	  issues	  in	  international	  affairs	  today.	  
	   This	  project	  analyzes	  the	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  presidential	  policy-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  I	  will	  ultimately	  present	  a	  set	  of	  four	  components	  that	  I	  argue	  played	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  
	  	   	  2	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  détente	  at	  the	  time	  he	  did.	  The	  four	  consequential	  factors	  include	  the	  following:	  First,	  when	  domestic	  conditions	  exist	  in	  which	  the	  general	  public	  is	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  policy.	  Second,	  when	  the	  existing	  international	  conditions	  allow	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  Third,	  when	  a	  president	  is	  personally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  “informal	  powers”	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  take	  leadership	  over	  public	  opinion.	  And	  fourth,	  when	  a	  president	  assumes	  office	  at	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  a	  previous	  “regime”	  of	  foreign	  policy	  is	  failing.	  	  
	  
I.	  President	  Nixon’s	  Background	  
In	  understanding	  how	  Nixon	  was	  able	  to	  arrive	  at	  détente,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  speak	  of	  his	  background,	  which	  directly	  relates	  to	  the	  often-­‐used	  proverb	  “only	  Nixon	  could	  have	  gone	  to	  China.”	  This	  phrase	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  ‘hard-­‐liner’	  politicians	  –	  such	  as	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐communist,	  in	  Nixon’s	  case	  –	  to	  take	  some	  sort	  of	  action	  or	  confront	  political	  taboos	  that	  would	  normally	  draw	  criticism	  if	  that	  same	  action	  had	  been	  taken	  by	  a	  politician	  that	  did	  not	  have	  a	  similar	  background	  or	  set	  of	  experiences	  that	  legitimized	  their	  authority.	  Then-­‐Congressman	  Richard	  Nixon	  first	  gained	  his	  anti-­‐communist	  credentials	  while	  serving	  on	  the	  House	  Un-­‐American	  Activities	  Committee	  (HUAC),	  which	  at	  the	  time	  focused	  its	  efforts	  on	  investigating	  potential	  infiltration	  of	  Communist	  Party	  members	  or	  sympathizers	  into	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  It	  was	  the	  HUAC’s	  high	  profile	  case	  of	  Alger	  Hiss	  –	  an	  accused	  
	  	   	  3	  Communist	  and	  Soviet	  Spy	  eventually	  convicted	  of	  perjury	  –	  that	  thrust	  Nixon	  into	  the	  spotlight.1	  One	  example	  of	  how	  Nixon	  utilized	  the	  relative	  fame	  he	  garnered	  from	  the	  Hiss	  investigation	  would	  be	  a	  slogan	  he	  used	  on	  flyers	  during	  his	  1950	  campaign	  for	  U.S.	  Senate:	  “The	  Man	  Who	  Broke	  the	  Hiss	  Case!!”	  	  
Building	  even	  further	  onto	  his	  newly	  found	  reputation	  as	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐communist,	  Nixon	  devised	  a	  clever	  campaign	  strategy	  against	  his	  Democratic	  opponent	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  seat,	  Helen	  Gahagan	  Douglas.	  Fellow	  Democrat	  Manchester	  Boddy,	  who	  was	  about	  to	  run	  against	  Ms.	  Gahagan	  in	  the	  Democratic	  primary,	  unleashed	  a	  personal	  attack	  on	  her	  by	  labeling	  her	  “The	  Pink	  Lady.”2	  (“Pink”,	  of	  course,	  referring	  to	  someone	  who	  may	  not	  be	  “red”,	  like	  a	  ‘true’	  communist,	  but	  rather	  someone	  who	  may	  be	  sympathetic	  to	  communism.)	  Nixon	  found	  an	  opening	  here,	  and	  used	  this	  opportunity	  to	  not	  only	  build	  on	  Boddy’s	  characterization	  of	  Ms.	  Douglas,	  but	  to	  also	  prop	  up	  his	  anti-­‐communist	  credentials	  in	  order	  make	  a	  clear	  contrast	  to	  the	  voters.	  Nixon	  won	  the	  Senate	  seat	  and	  was	  tapped	  by	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  to	  be	  his	  running	  mate	  in	  the	  1952	  Presidential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Weinstein,	  Allen.	  1971.	  “The	  Alger	  Hiss	  Case	  Revisited”.	  The	  American	  Scholar	  Vol.	  41	  (No.	  1).	  The	  Phi	  Beta	  Kappa	  Society.	  121.	  2	  Morris,	  Roger.	  Richard	  Milhous	  Nixon:	  the	  Rise	  of	  an	  American	  Politician.	  Holt	  &	  Co.,	  1990.	  581	  
	  	   	  4	  Election	  in	  large	  part	  thanks	  to	  the	  strong	  anti-­‐Communist	  reputation	  he	  had	  built	  for	  himself.3	  
After	  Nixon’s	  tenure	  as	  Vice	  President,	  he	  mounted	  his	  own	  presidential	  campaign	  in	  1960.	  However,	  his	  presidential	  aspirations	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  after	  losing	  to	  Democrat	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  by	  less	  than	  120,000	  votes,	  which	  amounted	  to	  0.2%	  of	  the	  popular	  vote.4	  Following	  another	  disappointing	  loss	  just	  two	  years	  later	  in	  his	  race	  for	  Governor	  of	  California,	  Nixon	  moved	  to	  New	  York	  City	  and	  returned	  to	  practicing	  law.	  Although	  out	  of	  public	  office,	  Nixon	  did	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  the	  spotlight.	  He	  often	  commented	  on	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  and	  Johnson	  administrations	  while	  also	  appearing	  on	  the	  campaign	  trail	  for	  fellow	  Republicans.	  Additionally,	  Nixon	  “retained	  the	  support	  of	  many	  Republicans	  across	  the	  country	  who	  respected	  his	  knowledge	  of	  politics	  and	  international	  affairs,	  a	  reputation	  enhanced	  in	  1967	  by	  Nixon’s	  article	  “Asia	  After	  Vietnam”	  in	  the	  eminent	  journal	  
Foreign	  Affairs.”5	  	  
Nixon	  decided	  in	  late	  1967	  to	  run	  for	  the	  White	  House	  a	  second	  time,	  but	  he	  was	  cautious	  and	  believed	  the	  1968	  presidential	  elections	  would	  be	  just	  as	  close	  as	  they	  were	  in	  1960.6	  He	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  issue	  was	  enough	  to	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/thelife/apolitician/thevicepresident.php	  “The	  Vice	  President.”	  (Accessed	  May	  1,	  2016)	  4	  Ibid.	  5	  Ibid.	  “Wilderness	  Years.”	  6	  Parmet,	  Herbert	  S.	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  His	  America.	  Little,	  Brown,	  1990.	  502.	  
	  	   	  5	  just	  hurt	  the	  Democrats,	  but	  may	  even	  be	  enough	  to	  get	  a	  Republican	  elected	  president.7	  
	  Nixon’s	  1968	  presidential	  campaign	  was	  very	  much	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  bringing	  Americans	  together	  through	  an	  emphasis	  of	  focusing	  on	  domestic	  political	  issues.	  Furthermore,	  although	  Nixon	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  the	  “foreign	  policy	  expert”	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  he	  was	  advised	  to	  soften	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War.8	  The	  reason	  for	  this,	  of	  course,	  was	  because	  the	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  had	  become	  a	  crucial	  issue	  in	  American	  political	  discourse	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  1968	  Presidential	  Elections.	  Nixon’s	  emphasis	  on	  domestic	  issues	  was	  certainly	  a	  noteworthy	  strategy.	  	  After	  all,	  as	  Chapter	  2	  will	  discuss	  in	  further	  detail,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  era	  of	  unrest	  and	  “counterculture,”	  which,	  among	  other	  things,	  included	  several	  years	  of	  ongoing	  civil	  rights	  and	  anti-­‐war	  protests	  that	  often	  turned	  violent,	  the	  assassination	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  on	  April	  4,	  1968,	  and	  the	  assassination	  of	  Bobby	  Kennedy	  two	  months	  later.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  addition	  to	  campaigning	  as	  a	  populist	  in	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  Nixon	  placed	  a	  particularly	  strong	  emphasis	  on	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  Ibid.	  8	  Novak,	  Robert;	  Evans,	  Rowland,	  "Nixon	  Firm	  in	  Vietnam	  Stand",	  The	  Free-­‐Lance	  
Star	  (Fredericksburg,	  Virginia,	  1967)	  3.	  
	  	   	  6	  domestic	  issues	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  such	  as	  a	  fear	  of	  rampant	  crime	  –	  whether	  it	  was	  or	  not	  was	  beside	  the	  point.9	  
Similar	  to	  Nixon’s	  own	  U.S.	  Senate	  campaign	  18	  years	  prior,	  Maryland	  Governor	  Spiro	  Agnew,	  Nixon’s	  running	  mate,	  painted	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  as	  someone	  soft	  on	  communism.10	  This,	  combined	  with	  the	  baggage	  of	  the	  disastrous	  ongoing	  Vietnam	  War	  –	  a	  war	  intensified	  by	  Humphrey’s	  boss,	  President	  Johnson	  –	  hurt	  Vice	  President	  Humphrey’s	  campaign.	  With	  Humphrey	  on	  the	  defense,	  “it	  was	  Nixon’s	  message	  of	  ‘law	  and	  order’	  that	  secured	  him	  the	  presidency.”11	  
	  
II.	  Outline	  of	  the	  Project	  
Chapter	  1	  of	  this	  project	  serves	  as	  a	  literature	  review	  of	  the	  leading	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  role	  of	  presidential	  power	  and	  decision-­‐making	  abilities.	  The	  four	  texts	  to	  be	  analyzed	  include	  Donald	  Snow’s	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Politics	  
Beyond	  the	  Water’s	  Edge,	  Richard	  Neustadt’s	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  
Presidents,	  Arthur	  Schlesinger’s	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency,	  and	  Stephen	  Skowronek’s	  
Presidential	  Leadership	  in	  Political	  Time.	  Chapter	  2	  serves	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Black,	  Conrad.	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon:	  A	  Life	  in	  Full.	  PublicAffairs,	  2008.	  550.	  	  10	  “Nation:	  The	  Counterpuncher.”	  Time,	  September	  20,	  1968.	  11	  Hanhimäki,	  Jussi	  M.	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Détente:	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  Potomac	  Books,	  Inc.,	  2012.	  34.	  
	  	   	  7	  what	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  was	  and	  why	  was	  it	  initiated.	  In	  answering	  this	  question,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  political	  context	  at	  the	  time	  Nixon	  initiated	  détente	  with	  a	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  policy	  of	  “containment”	  and	  the	  role	  it	  played	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  détente.	  Additionally,	  this	  chapter	  will	  define	  what	  the	  strategy	  of	  détente	  was	  and	  what	  its	  broader	  implications	  were.	  Chapter	  3	  will	  address	  why	  Nixon	  was	  able	  to	  initiate	  this	  drastic	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  at	  this	  particular	  moment.	  This	  question	  will	  be	  answered	  through	  analyzing	  both	  the	  international	  and	  domestics	  conditions	  of	  the	  time.	  In	  Chapter	  4,	  I	  will	  draw	  from	  my	  research	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  in	  order	  to	  formally	  introduce	  my	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  four	  factors	  I	  would	  argue	  enabled	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  Additionally,	  Chapter	  4	  will	  connect	  my	  discussion	  on	  these	  four	  factors	  with	  the	  literature	  review	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  end	  this	  project	  with	  a	  concluding	  section	  that	  will	  summarize	  my	  argument	  and	  findings,	  which	  will	  be	  based	  off	  of	  my	  research	  and	  analysis	  from	  previous	  four	  chapters.	  
In	  conclusion,	  Nixon’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐communist	  is	  quite	  interesting	  when	  considering	  it	  in	  association	  with	  his	  actions.	  For	  the	  previous	  reasons	  mentioned,	  Nixon	  was	  certainly	  an	  unlikely	  and	  unusual	  character	  to	  be	  pursuing	  this	  particular	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Indeed,	  the	  claim	  “only	  Nixon	  could	  go	  to	  China”	  directly	  relates	  to	  this	  relationship	  between	  Nixon’s	  reputation	  and	  his	  actions.	  The	  strategy	  of	  détente	  was	  not	  only	  intended	  to	  apply	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Rather,	  cases	  such	  as	  the	  “Basic	  Treaty”	  (which	  involved	  West	  and	  East	  Germany	  in	  
	  	   	  8	  1972)	  and	  the	  Helsinki	  Accords	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  at	  this	  time	  in	  American	  history,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  and	  decisive	  choice	  to	  make	  détente	  a	  key	  mandate	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	  this	  project	  analyzes	  the	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  presidential	  policy-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  through	  the	  examination	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  détente.	  One	  of	  the	  puzzles	  at	  hand	  is	  uncovering	  and	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  Nixon	  was	  able	  to	  pursue	  détente	  at	  the	  time	  he	  did.	  Throughout	  the	  chapters,	  the	  evidence	  of	  my	  argument	  will	  take	  shape	  and	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  my	  thesis,	  in	  which	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  four	  components	  played	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	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Chapter	  1	  
	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  present	  a	  literature	  review	  of	  the	  leading	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  role	  of	  presidential	  power	  and	  decision-­‐making	  abilities.	  The	  four	  texts	  analyzed	  include	  Donald	  Snow’s	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Politics	  Beyond	  
the	  Water’s	  Edge,	  Richard	  Neustadt’s	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents,	  Arthur	  Schlesinger’s	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency,	  and	  Stephen	  Skowronek’s	  Presidential	  
Leadership	  in	  Political	  Time.	  
I.	  Snow:	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Powers	  of	  the	  Presidency	  
	   The	  United	  States	  Constitution	  delegates	  foreign	  policy	  powers	  to	  both	  the	  president	  and	  congress.	  According	  to	  Donald	  Snow,	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  contemplated	  “a	  vigorous	  executive	  branch	  and	  a	  vigorous	  legislative	  branch	  with	  separate	  views	  and	  powers	  that	  would	  together	  set	  the	  country’s	  course	  in	  international	  affairs.”12	  In	  other	  words,	  Snow	  argues	  that	  neither	  body	  has	  sole	  authority	  over	  America’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Rather,	  the	  system	  was	  designed	  so	  the	  two	  bodies	  would	  be	  required	  to	  work	  together.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Snow,	  Donald	  M.	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Politics	  Beyond	  the	  Water's	  Edge.	  3rd	  ed.	  Thomson/Wadsworth,	  2005.	  90.	  
	  	   	  10	  President,	  Snow	  defines	  the	  two	  different	  types	  of	  powers	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  possesses:	  the	  “formal	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency”	  and	  the	  “informal	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency.”13	  As	  these	  two	  terms	  are	  used	  throughout	  the	  project,	  their	  definitions	  and	  implications	  are	  necessary	  to	  examine.	  
	   “Formal	  powers”,	  according	  to	  Snow,	  are	  the	  powers	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  directly	  allocates	  to	  the	  president.	  These	  formal	  powers	  include	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  formal	  roles	  of	  the	  President	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  including	  Chief	  Executive,	  Head	  of	  State,	  and	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Stated	  briefly,	  the	  Chief	  Executive	  oversees	  all	  federal	  agencies.	  The	  role	  of	  Head	  of	  State	  provides	  the	  president	  with	  “symbolic	  personification.”	  And	  as	  Commander	  in	  Chief,	  the	  President	  serves	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Military.14	  Furthermore,	  additional	  “formal	  powers”	  allocated	  to	  the	  president	  include	  “enumerated	  powers	  over	  treaty	  negotiations,	  nomination	  and	  appointment	  of	  key	  personnel,	  and	  the	  recognition	  of	  foreign	  regimes.”15	  	  
Alongside	  the	  aforementioned	  “formal	  powers”,	  Snow	  offers	  four	  examples	  of	  what	  he	  describes	  as	  the	  “informal	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency.”	  Principally,	  these	  four	  powers	  include	  “presidential	  singularity”,	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  through	  media	  access,	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership,	  and	  “president	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ibid.	  	  14	  Ibid.	  90-­‐92.	  15	  Ibid.	  91.	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  doctrines.”16	  “Presidential	  singularity”	  refers	  to	  the	  president’s	  unique	  position	  as	  a	  singular	  entity	  voted	  for	  by	  the	  entire	  American	  public.	  As	  Snow	  writes,	  “The	  president’s	  greatest	  advantage	  over	  Congress	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  is	  a	  single,	  universally	  known	  leader,	  whereas	  the	  Congress	  is	  inherently	  a	  comparatively	  faceless	  corporate	  body	  comprising	  535	  members.”17	  This	  singularity	  the	  president	  possesses,	  combined	  with	  the	  formal	  (yet	  symbolic)	  title	  of	  “Head	  of	  State,”	  gives	  the	  president	  a	  unique	  platform	  when	  “the	  country	  instinctively	  looks	  to	  the	  president	  for	  strength	  and	  reassurance	  about	  the	  future.”18	  This	  power	  is	  best	  exemplified	  by	  the	  support	  the	  president	  often	  receives	  during	  moments	  in	  American	  history	  where	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  “rally	  ‘round	  the	  flag	  effect”	  take	  place.	  An	  early	  example	  would	  be	  former	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy’s	  approval	  rating	  increasing	  by	  14%	  from	  61%	  in	  October	  of	  1962	  to	  75%	  the	  following	  month	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis.19	  A	  more	  recent	  example	  would	  be	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  approval	  rating	  surging	  from	  51%	  on	  September	  10th,	  2001	  to	  86%	  on	  September	  15th,	  2001.	  One	  week	  later,	  President	  Bush’s	  approval	  rating	  reached	  90%,	  which	  remains	  the	  highest	  approval	  rating	  of	  any	  sitting	  President	  in	  American	  history.20	  	  Of	  the	  sharp	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  Ibid.	  95-­‐96.	  17	  Ibid.	  95.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Presidential	  Approval	  Ratings	  –	  Gallup	  Historical	  Statistics	  and	  Trends.”	  Gallup.com.	  (Accessed	  on	  May	  1,	  2016)	  http://www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-­‐approval-­‐ratings-­‐gallup-­‐historical-­‐statistics-­‐trends.aspx	  	  20	  Hetherington,	  Marc	  J.,	  and	  Michael	  Nelson.	  "Anatomy	  of	  a	  Rally	  Effect:	  George	  W.	  Bush	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism."	  Political	  Science	  and	  Politics	  36,	  no.	  01	  (2003):	  37.	  
	  	   	  12	  spike	  in	  President	  Kennedy’s	  approval	  rating,	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  that	  is	  due	  in	  thanks	  to	  the	  Snow’s	  next	  “informal	  power”:	  the	  president’s	  ability	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  through	  media	  access.	  
	   As	  a	  key	  benefit	  of	  “presidential	  singularity,”	  the	  president	  has	  the	  unique	  ability	  to	  directly	  communicate	  whatever	  message	  or	  policy	  proposal	  he	  seeks	  to	  convey.	  As	  Snow	  notes,	  “Anything	  the	  President	  does	  or	  says	  is	  automatically	  national	  news,”	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  reasons	  Snow	  includes	  “shaping	  public	  opinion	  through	  media	  access”	  as	  one	  of	  the	  president’s	  informal	  powers.	  Indeed,	  this	  unique	  ability	  of	  the	  president	  is	  attainable	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  White	  House	  has	  its	  own	  press	  corps,	  which	  consists	  of	  virtually	  all	  major	  media	  outlets	  (regardless	  of	  perceived	  political	  bias),	  and	  is	  tasked	  with	  reporting	  the	  president’s	  every	  move.	  Undoubtedly,	  it	  takes	  a	  skillful	  politician	  to	  utilize	  this	  opportunity	  to	  his	  advantage.	  For	  example,	  some	  politicians	  are	  known	  for	  perceived	  charm	  and	  likability	  when	  the	  cameras	  are	  rolling.	  A	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  the	  first	  televised	  presidential	  debate	  in	  1960	  between	  Democrat	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  and	  Republican	  Richard	  Nixon.	  During	  this	  debate,	  a	  visibly	  exhausted	  Richard	  Nixon	  was	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  relatively	  young,	  bright,	  and	  well	  prepared	  John	  F.	  Kennedy.21	  Indeed,	  this	  first	  televised	  presidential	  debate	  is	  often	  credited	  as	  a	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  Foner,	  Eric.	  Give	  Me	  Liberty!	  An	  American	  History.	  Seagull	  Fourth	  ed.	  WW	  Norton	  &	  Co,	  2013.	  483.	  
	  	   	  13	  moment	  that	  changed	  the	  way	  politicians	  take	  into	  account	  their	  perceived	  public	  image	  via	  media	  outlets.22	  
According	  to	  Snow,	  the	  third	  informal	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  is	  the	  visibility	  and	  credibility	  he	  gains	  through	  his	  role	  in	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership.	  Indeed,	  the	  sheer	  visibility	  presidents	  gain	  from	  this	  informal	  power	  adds	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility	  to	  their	  public	  image.	  Among	  U.S.	  presidents,	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt	  arguably	  serves	  as	  an	  appropriate	  example	  as	  a	  U.S.	  president	  who	  possessed	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  credibility	  in	  world	  leadership	  at	  the	  time.	  While	  his	  credibility	  was	  certainly	  enhanced	  due	  to	  serving	  as	  president	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  FDR	  and	  other	  world	  leaders	  at	  that	  time,	  such	  as	  Winston	  Churchill	  and	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  remain	  internationally	  recognized	  figures	  due	  their	  leadership	  roles	  and	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  played	  such	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  assuming	  the	  conditions	  (and	  end	  result)	  of	  America’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  war	  were	  the	  same,	  any	  president	  who	  served	  at	  that	  time	  would	  have	  had	  the	  same	  lasting	  legacy	  FDR	  possesses	  to	  this	  day.	  As	  Snow	  would	  argue,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  informal	  power	  that	  U.S.	  presidents	  are	  positioned	  to	  gain	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  international	  credibility	  –	  and	  thus,	  legitimacy	  –	  due	  to	  their	  role	  in	  significant	  global	  affairs.	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  Webley, Kayla. "How the Nixon-Kennedy Debate Changed the World." Time. September 23, 2010. 
Accessed May 01, 2016. http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2021078,00.html. 	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  Snow’s	  fourth	  and	  final	  informal	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  is	  “the	  president’s	  ability	  to	  put	  his	  distinctive	  stamp	  on	  policy	  by	  unilaterally	  proclaiming	  doctrines	  bearing	  his	  name.”23	  Indeed,	  many	  presidents	  have	  their	  own	  self-­‐named	  doctrines,	  and	  these	  doctrines	  remain	  historically	  significant	  when	  studying	  respective	  presidential	  legacies.	  For	  example,	  those	  who	  study	  the	  presidency	  of	  Harry	  Truman	  are	  certain	  to	  learn	  of	  one	  of	  the	  key	  pillars	  of	  his	  legacy:	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine.”	  Introduced	  in	  1947,	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  was	  President	  Truman’s	  proclamation	  that	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  would	  shift	  in	  a	  direction	  aimed	  at	  containing	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  communism.	  As	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  project,	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  created	  a	  lasting	  impact	  on	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  through	  the	  Johnson	  Administration,	  nearly	  twenty	  years	  later.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  Truman	  and	  other	  presidents	  with	  doctrines	  that	  bear	  their	  names,	  these	  men	  succeeded	  in	  exemplifying	  this	  informal	  power	  by	  –	  in	  Snow’s	  words	  –	  “seiz[ing]	  and	  defin[ing]	  the	  essential	  direction	  of	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  policy	  through	  [their]	  capacity	  to	  command	  wide	  attention,	  speak	  with	  a	  single	  voice,	  and	  conduct	  [themselves]	  as	  the	  broadly	  defined	  national	  leader	  that	  so	  many	  now	  expect	  American	  presidents	  to	  be.”24	  
Though	  Snow’s	  “formal	  powers”	  certainly	  have	  significance	  in	  term	  of	  the	  president’s	  influence	  on	  foreign	  policy,	  such	  as	  the	  president’s	  ability	  to	  nominate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Snow,	  Politics	  Beyond	  the	  Water’s	  Edge.	  96-­‐97.	  24	  Ibid.	  97.	  
	  	   	  15	  ambassadors	  and	  formally	  recognize	  foreign	  regimes,	  Snow’s	  argument	  suggests	  that	  presidents	  who	  display	  significant	  strength	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  arena	  have	  learned	  to	  utilize	  –	  and	  therefore	  benefit	  more	  from	  –	  their	  “informal	  powers.”	  Indeed,	  certainly	  since	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  president’s	  “informal	  powers”	  have	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  beneficial	  to	  his	  overall	  influence	  and	  the	  decision-­‐making	  powers	  he	  yields.	   	   	   	  
	  
II.	  Neustadt:	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidency	  
In	  analyzing	  the	  role	  of	  the	  president	  in	  crafting	  and	  influencing	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  another	  important	  theme	  to	  discuss	  is	  the	  president’s	  “power	  to	  persuade.”	  Similar	  to	  Donald	  Snow’s	  “informal	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency,”	  the	  ability	  to	  persuade	  is	  one	  that	  certainly	  can	  be	  enabled	  by	  variety	  of	  outlets	  mentioned	  by	  Snow	  that	  a	  skilled	  president	  could	  tactfully	  use	  to	  his	  advantage,	  such	  as	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  televised	  debate	  performance	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  or	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt’s	  revolutionary	  use	  of	  radio	  to	  reach	  the	  American	  public.	  However,	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  Snow’s	  “informal	  powers”	  and	  Neustadt’s	  “power	  to	  persuade”	  is	  that	  Neustadt	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  president’s	  power	  to	  bargain	  with	  other	  officials	  rather	  than	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion.	  
	  	   	  16	  Richard	  Neustadt	  introduces	  his	  theory	  of	  presidential	  persuasion	  in	  his	  book	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidency.	  Stepping	  back	  for	  a	  moment,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Neustadt	  and	  Snow	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  fundamental	  disagreement	  regarding	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches	  having	  “separate	  powers.”	  Snow	  writes	  the	  following:	  
“Both	  branches	  were	  given	  their	  own	  independent	  source	  of	  authority,	  and	  the	  powers	  of	  both	  were	  carefully	  checked	  and	  balanced	  by	  powers	  given	  to	  the	  other.	  In	  making	  public	  policy,	  including	  foreign	  policy,	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  believed	  in	  
codetermination	  by	  the	  two	  coequal	  elected	  branches,	  with	  neither	  branch	  dominant	  over	  or	  subordinate	  to	  the	  other.”25	  
Snow	  adds	  to	  this,	  “…	  What	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  contemplated	  was	  a	  vigorous	  executive	  branch	  and	  a	  vigorous	  legislative	  branch	  with	  separate	  views	  and	  powers	  that	  would	  together	  set	  the	  country’s	  course	  in	  international	  affairs.”26	  Neustadt,	  however,	  has	  a	  different	  take	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  “separate	  powers.”	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Snow,	  Neustadt	  writes	  that	  while	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution	  was	  supposed	  to	  have	  created	  a	  government	  of	  separate	  powers,	  “it	  did	  nothing	  of	  the	  sort.”	  “Rather,”	  Neustadt	  argues,	  “[the	  Constitution]	  created	  a	  government	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.	  90.	  26	  Ibid.	  
	  	   	  17	  separate	  institutions	  sharing	  powers.”27	  These	  two	  different	  understandings	  of	  “separate	  powers”	  vs.	  “shared	  powers”	  are	  relevant	  because	  they	  show	  how	  Snow	  and	  Neustadt	  framed	  their	  arguments	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  president	  can	  best	  utilize	  his	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  his	  effectiveness.	  Snow’s	  argument	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  president	  inherits	  a	  set	  of	  “formal	  and	  informal	  powers,”	  and	  he	  is	  therefore	  responsible	  for	  maximizing	  his	  ability	  in	  navigating	  these	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  his	  agenda.	  Neustadt,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  from	  Snow,	  which	  is	  more	  deeply	  analyzed	  in	  the	  following	  paragraph.	  In	  summary,	  though	  Neustadt	  and	  Snow	  disagree	  on	  the	  power	  structure	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches,	  they	  do	  seem	  to	  agree	  on	  what	  Snow	  calls	  “codetermination.”	  Both	  men	  acknowledge	  the	  obvious	  fact	  that	  the	  president	  must	  work	  with	  the	  congress	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  his	  agenda,	  but	  Neustadt	  adds	  to	  this	  by	  introducing	  his	  theory	  that	  the	  president	  must	  go	  further	  and	  make	  use	  of	  his	  “power	  to	  persuade.”	  	  
	   	  Neustadt’s	  theory	  surrounding	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  president’s	  “power	  to	  persuade”	  is	  perhaps	  best	  understood	  through	  a	  story	  he	  includes	  about	  former-­‐Army	  General-­‐turned-­‐President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower’s	  realization	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  his	  ‘formal’	  power.	  According	  to	  Robert	  J.	  Donovan’s	  Eisenhower:	  The	  Inside	  Story,	  Eisenhower	  often	  learned	  the	  hard	  way	  that	  running	  the	  executive	  branch	  was	  nothing	  like	  his	  time	  in	  the	  Army.	  To	  further	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  Neustadt	  recalls	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Neustadt,	  Richard	  E.	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Leadership	  from	  
Roosevelt	  to	  Reagan.	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1991.	  29.	  
	  	   	  18	  encounter	  in	  1958	  he	  personally	  had	  with	  an	  Eisenhower	  aide	  who	  made	  the	  following	  remark:	  "The	  president	  still	  feels	  that	  when	  he's	  decided	  something,	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  end	  of	  it	  ...	  and	  when	  it	  bounces	  back	  undone	  or	  done	  wrong,	  he	  tends	  to	  react	  with	  shocked	  surprise."28	  This	  same	  acquaintance	  of	  Neustadt	  also	  mentioned,	  "I	  sit	  here	  all	  day	  trying	  to	  persuade	  people	  to	  do	  the	  things	  they	  ought	  to	  have	  sense	  enough	  to	  do	  without	  my	  persuading	  them....	  That's	  all	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  President	  amount	  to."29	  Neustadt	  states	  that	  although	  the	  president	  has	  “an	  extraordinary	  range	  of	  formal	  powers”,	  these	  anecdotes	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  “despite	  his	  ‘powers’	  [the	  president]	  does	  not	  obtain	  results	  by	  giving	  orders-­‐or	  not,	  at	  any	  rate,	  merely	  by	  giving	  orders.”	  Furthermore,	  he	  adds,	  “despite	  his	  status	  [the	  president]	  does	  not	  get	  action	  without	  argument.”	  This	  sets	  up	  Neustadt	  to	  present	  his	  thesis:	  “Presidential	  power	  is	  the	  power	  to	  persuade…”30	  	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	  in	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Donald	  Snow	  writes	  that	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches	  have	  ‘separate’	  powers.	  Neustadt’s	  argument,	  however,	  states	  that	  although	  those	  two	  branches	  of	  government	  are	  separate,	  they	  actually	  have	  shared	  powers,	  not	  separate	  powers.	  Furthermore,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Ibid.	  10.	  29	  Ibid.	  30	  Ibid.	  11.	  
	  	   	  19	  Neustadt	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  that	  “separateness	  of	  institutions	  and	  the	  sharing	  of	  authority”	  that	  “prescribe	  the	  terms	  on	  which	  a	  President	  persuades.”31	  
Neustadt	  also	  argues	  that	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  “shared	  powers”	  of	  the	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branches,	  the	  president	  is	  actually	  a	  relatively	  weak	  figure	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  (in	  terms	  of	  having	  the	  autonomy	  to	  pursue	  his	  agenda	  without	  opposition	  or	  resistance).	  In	  order	  to	  effectively	  combat	  this	  inevitable	  resistance	  and	  to	  maximize	  his	  influence,	  Neustadt	  writes	  the	  following:	  “Effective	  influence	  for	  the	  man	  in	  the	  White	  House	  stems	  from	  three	  related	  sources:	  first	  are	  the	  bargaining	  advantages	  inherent	  in	  his	  job	  with	  which	  to	  persuade	  other	  men	  that	  what	  he	  wants	  of	  them	  in	  what	  their	  own	  responsibilities	  require	  them	  to	  do.	  Second	  are	  the	  expectations	  of	  those	  other	  men	  regarding	  his	  ability	  and	  will	  to	  use	  the	  various	  advantages	  they	  think	  he	  has.	  Third	  are	  those	  men’s	  estimates	  of	  how	  his	  public	  views	  him	  and	  how	  their	  publics	  may	  view	  them	  if	  they	  do	  what	  he	  wants.”32	  In	  short,	  the	  core	  of	  Neustadt’s	  argument	  states	  that	  if	  the	  president	  is	  to	  successfully	  pursue	  and	  implement	  his	  agenda,	  he	  must	  utilize	  his	  persuasive	  skills,	  maintain	  a	  solid	  reputation,	  and	  protect	  and	  enhance	  his	  perceived	  public	  image.	  
There	  are	  many	  well-­‐known	  examples	  of	  presidents	  utilizing	  this	  type	  of	  “persuasive	  power”	  described	  by	  Neustadt.	  One	  example	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  is	  the	  reputation	  of	  President	  Lyndon	  Baines	  Johnson.	  	  LBJ’s	  reputation	  as	  arguably	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Ibid.	  30.	  32	  Ibid.	  150.	  
	  	   	  20	  most	  effective	  Senate	  Majority	  Leader	  in	  U.S.	  history	  was	  “built	  upon	  two	  footings:	  he	  could	  ‘count	  heads,’	  meaning	  that	  he	  knew	  where	  every	  senator	  stood	  on	  every	  important	  issue;	  and	  he	  was	  a	  renowned	  reputation	  ‘arm	  twister,’	  meaning	  that	  he	  also	  knew	  the	  best	  way	  to	  approach	  each	  senator.”33	  Regardless	  of	  often	  being	  dismissed	  simply	  as	  the	  president	  who	  got	  the	  United	  States	  deeply	  entangled	  in	  Vietnam,	  President	  Johnson	  has	  a	  lasting	  legacy	  that	  most	  certainly	  is	  owed	  to	  his	  rather	  unorthodox	  style	  of	  negotiating	  (or,	  perhaps,	  “persuading”).	  After	  all,	  even	  considering	  his	  Vietnam	  blunder,	  LBJ	  was	  the	  man	  responsible	  for	  signing	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act,	  Voting	  Rights	  Act,	  and	  appointing	  the	  first	  African-­‐American	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court;	  hardly	  a	  simple	  task	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Indeed,	  LBJ	  demonstrates	  there	  may	  very	  well	  be	  credibility	  to	  Neustadt’s	  theory	  of	  persuasion	  being	  a	  necessity	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  (and	  ultimately	  implementing)	  one’s	  agenda.	  	  
President	  Johnson’s	  case	  brings	  up	  another	  theme	  related	  to	  the	  president’s	  power	  to	  persuade.	  Although	  LBJ’s	  well-­‐known	  ‘backroom’	  style	  of	  ‘wheeling	  and	  dealing’	  undoubtedly	  worked	  to	  his	  advantage	  in	  many	  instances,	  one	  must	  wonder	  if	  the	  very	  stature	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president	  commands	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  authority	  or	  compliance.	  On	  this,	  Neustadt	  writes	  “A	  President’s	  authority	  and	  status	  give	  him	  great	  advantages	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  men	  he	  would	  persuade.”34	  This	  “authority”	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  Cowger,	  Thomas	  W.,	  and	  Sherwin	  Markman.	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  Remembered:	  An	  Intimate	  Portrait	  of	  a	  
Presidency.	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2003.	  73.	  34	  Neustadt.	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents,	  30.	  
	  	   	  21	  Neustadt	  writes	  of	  begs	  a	  question:	  Could	  that	  “authority”	  emanate	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  fear?	  Undoubtedly,	  this	  idea	  of	  “fear”	  is	  not	  one	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  directly	  exuded	  by	  the	  president	  in	  terms	  of	  intentionally	  threatening	  or	  intimidating.	  Rather,	  Neustadt	  argues	  that	  the	  president	  already	  exudes	  an	  ‘aura’,	  and	  this	  could	  make	  him	  appear	  to	  be	  intimidating	  or	  difficult	  to	  refuse.	  On	  this,	  Neustadt	  writes,	  “With	  hardly	  any	  exception,	  those	  who	  share	  in	  governing	  this	  country	  are	  aware	  that	  at	  some	  time,	  in	  some	  degree,	  the	  doing	  of	  their	  jobs,	  the	  furthering	  of	  their	  ambitions,	  may	  depend	  upon	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States.”35	  Whether	  involving	  President	  Johnson	  or	  others,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  playing	  into	  these	  “fears”	  while	  seeking	  to	  persuade	  must	  certainly	  be	  a	  useful	  strategy	  of	  the	  president’s	  “power	  to	  persuade.”	  Indeed,	  as	  Neustadt	  later	  adds,	  “Their	  need	  or	  fear	  is	  his	  advantage.”36	  	  
	  
III.	  Schlesinger:	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency	  
	   In	  a	  contrast	  to	  Snow	  and	  Neustadt,	  Arthur	  Schlesinger	  Jr.	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  debate	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency.	  In	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency,	  Schlesinger’s	  objective	  is	  to	  analyze	  the	  powers	  the	  president	  has	  at	  his	  disposal	  and	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  powers	  could	  potentially	  be	  threatening.	  More	  specifically,	  he	  writes	  that	  his	  book	  is	  neither	  intended	  to	  address	  “all	  facets	  and	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  22	  issues	  of	  presidential	  power”	  nor	  “deal	  primarily	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  political	  balance	  between	  congress	  and	  the	  presidency…”	  The	  latter,	  of	  course,	  were	  the	  central	  themes	  previously	  discussed	  in	  the	  Snow	  and	  Neustadt	  pieces.	  	  Rather,	  Schlesinger’s	  book	  “deals	  essentially	  with	  the	  shift	  in	  constitutional	  balance	  –	  with,	  that	  is,	  the	  appropriation	  by	  the	  Presidency,	  of	  powers	  reserved	  by	  the	  Constitution	  and	  by	  long	  historical	  practice.”37	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  presidency	  has	  gotten	  out	  of	  control	  and	  distanced	  itself	  so	  far	  from	  its	  constitutional	  intent	  that	  at	  the	  time	  he	  was	  writing,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  entered	  an	  era	  of	  an	  “imperial	  presidency.”	  The	  implication	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  “imperial	  presidency”,	  Schlesinger	  writes,	  is	  that	  “unless	  the	  American	  democracy	  figures	  out	  how	  to	  control	  the	  Presidency	  in	  war	  and	  peace	  without	  enfeebling	  the	  Presidency	  across	  the	  board,	  then	  our	  system	  of	  government	  will	  face	  grave	  troubles.”38	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Schlesinger’s	  argument	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  the	  powers	  constitutionally	  bestowed	  upon	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  branches,	  he	  argues	  about	  what	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  intended	  for	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president.	  Most	  notably,	  regarding	  foreign	  policy	  and	  war,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  deliberately	  “chose	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  President	  at	  all	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  war-­‐making	  power.”39	  This,	  Schlesinger	  argues,	  was	  not	  simply	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  Schlesinger,	  Arthur	  M.	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency.	  Houghton	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  2004.	  VIII.	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  Ibid.	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  23	  due	  to	  their	  naïveté.	  In	  making	  this	  claim,	  he	  cites	  the	  23rd	  Federalist	  paper,	  in	  which	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  argues	  “the	  powers	  of	  self-­‐defense	  ‘must	  exist	  without	  limitation,	  because	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  foresee	  or	  define	  the	  extent	  and	  variety	  of	  national	  exigencies…’”40	  In	  simpler	  terms,	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  certainly	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  (including	  the	  presidency)	  should	  be	  without	  the	  necessary	  powers	  to	  defend	  itself.	  Rather,	  this	  power	  must	  be	  allocated	  to	  the	  government	  “as	  a	  whole	  –	  for,	  that,	  is,	  Congress	  and	  the	  Presidency	  combined.”41	  This	  is	  relevant	  because	  Schlesinger’s	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  becomes	  “imperial”	  once	  it	  oversteps	  the	  constitutionally	  allocated	  powers	  originally	  bestowed	  upon	  the	  office.	  
As	  Schlesinger	  reminds	  us,	  Article	  I	  Section	  VIII	  of	  the	  Constitution	  clearly	  states,	  “The	  Congress	  shall	  have	  power	  to	  declare	  war.”	  Indeed,	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  were	  cautious	  and	  determined	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency	  did	  not	  mirror	  those	  of	  the	  British	  King.42	  Particularly	  regarding	  matters	  of	  foreign	  affairs,	  this	  conscious	  effort	  to	  establish	  a	  “balance	  of	  powers”	  sought	  to	  not	  let	  the	  president	  give	  too	  much	  autonomy	  over	  the	  congress.	  However,	  Schlesinger	  writes,	  “What	  does	  seem	  clear	  is	  that	  no	  one	  wanted	  either	  to	  deny	  the	  President	  the	  power	  to	  respond	  to	  surprise	  attack	  or	  to	  give	  the	  President	  general	  power	  to	  initiate	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  24	  hostiles.”43	  It	  is	  in	  this	  predicament	  that	  Schlesinger	  believes	  those	  relatively	  new	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency	  have	  been	  prescribed.	  Certainly,	  the	  Founding	  Fathers	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  limit	  the	  executive	  branch	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  country.	  But	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  this	  quandary	  created	  a	  slippery	  slope	  much	  later	  where	  Congress’	  separation	  of	  powers	  –	  which	  are	  intended	  to	  “check”	  the	  president’s	  powers	  –	  had	  been	  overrun.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  presidency	  with	  too	  much	  autonomy.	  
Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  we	  are	  now	  living	  in	  an	  era	  of	  an	  “imperial	  presidency”	  due	  to	  	  “…	  the	  circumstances	  of	  an	  increasingly	  perilous	  world	  as	  well	  as	  of	  an	  increasingly	  independent	  economy	  and	  society	  seemed	  to	  compel	  a	  larger	  concentration	  of	  authority	  in	  the	  Presidency.”44	  Moreover,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  leading	  cause	  of	  the	  “imperial	  presidency”	  stems	  from	  issues	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  newly	  acquired	  “war	  powers.”	  These	  “war	  powers,”	  Schlesinger	  argues,	  have	  increased	  since	  the	  United	  States	  became	  a	  global	  superpower,	  and	  continue	  to	  increase	  through	  times	  of	  war.	  However,	  it	  wasn’t	  always	  this	  way.	  Schlesinger	  writes,	  “The	  assumption	  of	  [war-­‐making	  power]	  by	  the	  Presidency	  was	  gradual	  and	  usually	  under	  the	  demand	  or	  pretext	  of	  emergency.”45	  However,	  he	  argues	  that	  there	  has	  since	  been	  gradual	  withering	  away	  of	  appropriate	  “checks”	  to	  the	  president’s	  war-­‐making	  powers.	  And	  because	  these	  checks	  have	  withered	  away	  so	  much,	  Schlesinger	  writes,	  “By	  the	  early	  1970s	  the	  American	  President	  had	  become	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  25	  on	  issues	  of	  war	  and	  peace	  the	  most	  absolute	  monarch	  (with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  Mao	  Tse-­‐tung	  of	  China)	  among	  the	  great	  powers	  of	  the	  world.”46	  Indeed,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  new	  presidential	  powers	  are	  not	  in	  anyway	  allocated	  through	  the	  constitution,	  Schlesinger	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  is	  greatly	  in	  need	  of	  restraint.	  
In	  concluding	  his	  argument,	  Schlesinger’s	  provides	  several	  examples	  that	  illustrate	  the	  consequences	  the	  “imperial	  presidency”	  has	  already	  had	  on	  United	  States’	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  affairs.	  Among	  them	  include	  the	  “all-­‐purpose	  invocation	  of	  ‘national	  security,’	  the	  insistence	  on	  executive	  secrecy,	  the	  withholding	  of	  information	  from	  Congress,	  the	  refusal	  to	  spend	  funds	  appropriated	  by	  Congress,	  the	  attempted	  intimidation	  of	  the	  press,	  [and]	  the	  use	  of	  the	  White	  House	  itself	  as	  a	  base	  for	  espionage	  and	  sabotage	  directed	  against	  political	  opposition…”47	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  this	  problem,	  he	  argues,	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  find	  a	  “middle	  ground	  between	  making	  the	  President	  a	  Czar	  and	  making	  him	  a	  puppet.”48	  Furthermore,	  such	  a	  task	  can	  only	  be	  completed	  if	  the	  American	  democracy	  discovers	  a	  way	  to	  create	  a	  “strong	  and	  purposeful	  Presidency	  with	  equally	  strong	  and	  purposeful	  forms	  of	  democratic	  control.”49	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  26	  	   Using	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  to	  illustrate	  his	  example,	  Schlesinger	  refers	  to	  this	  point	  in	  American	  history	  when	  the	  presidency	  became	  “rampant.”	  The	  period	  of	  time	  when	  the	  president’s	  “mystique	  was	  in	  full	  glory”	  occurred	  when	  the	  United	  States	  began	  its	  military	  intervention	  in	  Vietnam.50	  This	  era	  began	  as	  a	  result	  of	  President’s	  Kennedy’s	  intervention,	  which,	  Schlesinger	  writes,	  “was	  limited	  and	  provoked	  no	  constitutional	  questions.”51	  Moreover,	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  during	  this	  era	  of	  the	  “rampant”	  presidency	  when	  the	  congress,	  in	  some	  ways,	  lost	  power	  to	  the	  presidency.	  This	  loss	  of	  congressional	  power	  was	  part	  of	  the	  evolution	  (or	  rather,	  ‘adaption’)	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency	  that	  most	  certainly	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  presidential	  decision-­‐making	  thereafter.	  
	   Schlesinger	  writes	  that	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  was	  indeed	  one	  who	  exhibited	  the	  qualities	  of	  a	  “rampant”	  president.	  For	  example,	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  preventing	  American	  casualties,	  “in	  the	  spring	  of	  1965,	  Johnson	  ordered	  22,000	  American	  troops	  to	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  without	  seeking	  congressional	  authorization.”52	  Schlesinger	  notes	  that	  Johnson’s	  reasoning	  certainly	  fell	  within	  the	  norm	  of	  executive	  authorization	  with	  congressional	  approval.	  However,	  the	  “22,000	  troops	  were	  about	  a	  hundred	  times	  more	  than	  were	  necessary	  for	  the	  specified	  purpose.”53	  It	  was	  later	  discovered	  that	  Johnson	  wanted	  to	  deploy	  that	  many	  troops	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  Ibid.	  52	  Ibid.	  178.	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  27	  to	  intimidate	  communist	  governments	  from	  getting	  any	  ideas	  when,	  according	  to	  Schlesinger,	  he	  said,	  “we	  don’t	  propose	  to	  sit	  here	  in	  our	  rocking	  chair	  with	  our	  hands	  folded	  and	  let	  the	  Communists	  set	  up	  any	  government	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.”54	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  noteworthy	  case	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  However,	  what	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  striking	  is	  that	  Johnson	  utilized	  what	  was	  considered	  the	  “traditional	  usage”	  of	  executive	  power	  for	  a	  political	  purpose.	  Indeed,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  his	  original	  intent	  of	  sending	  troops	  to	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  in	  order	  to	  save	  American	  lives	  was,	  in	  fact,	  justified.	  And	  while	  I	  make	  no	  claim	  about	  that	  intention,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  he	  used	  his	  leverage	  in	  an	  inappropriate	  way	  that	  arguably	  would	  not	  have	  sat	  well	  with	  the	  congress.	  Furthermore,	  this	  example	  shows	  how	  the	  president	  can	  use	  his	  powers	  to	  not	  outright	  ‘break’	  the	  rules,	  but	  perhaps	  simply	  ‘bend’	  them.	  	  
	   Schlesinger	  also	  credits	  President	  Johnson	  for	  shifting	  the	  public	  opinion	  surrounding	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  to	  “our	  war”	  from	  Kennedy’s	  original	  declaration	  that	  this	  was	  “their	  war.”	  (In	  this	  case,	  “our”	  being	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  “their”	  being	  Vietnam.)	  Indeed,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Vietnam	  War,	  it	  had	  been	  the	  longest	  war	  in	  American	  history,	  second	  in	  expense	  only	  to	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  had	  caused	  “more	  Americans	  deaths	  in	  combat	  than	  any	  except	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  the	  two	  World	  War.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	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  Ibid.	  178-­‐179.	  
	  	   	  28	  	   Perhaps	  no	  other	  piece	  of	  legislation	  better	  symbolizes	  the	  “rampant”	  presidency	  than	  the	  “Gulf	  of	  Tonkin	  Resolution”,	  officially	  known	  as	  the	  Southeast	  Asian	  Resolution.	  This	  resolution	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  President	  Johnson	  to	  authorize	  military	  force	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  without	  congressional	  authorization	  or	  a	  formal	  congressional	  “declaration	  of	  war.”	  This	  piece	  of	  legislation,	  which	  Schlesinger	  would	  most	  certainly	  categorize	  as	  a	  vile	  insult	  to	  the	  Founding	  Fathers’	  original	  intent,	  was	  so	  paramount	  because	  it	  was	  a	  clear	  attempt	  by	  the	  executive	  branch	  to	  bypass	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  
Schlesinger’s	  emphasis	  and	  concern	  regarding	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Tonkin	  Resolution	  was	  not	  simply	  rooted	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  believed	  it	  was	  an	  irresponsible	  allocation	  of	  powers	  to	  the	  president.	  Rather,	  he	  emphasizes	  that	  this	  resolution	  served	  as	  a	  ‘slippery	  slope’	  for	  presidential	  power	  that	  could	  (and	  ultimately	  did)	  have	  profound	  consequences.	  Schlesinger	  adds	  to	  this	  point	  by	  writing	  that	  under	  a	  theory	  like	  this,	  it	  “is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  any	  future	  President	  would	  ever	  see	  any	  legal	  need	  to	  go	  to	  Congress	  before	  leading	  the	  nation	  into	  war.”56	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Snow	  and	  Neustadt,	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  an	  effective	  congress	  with	  enough	  powers	  to	  “check”	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  an	  absolute	  necessity	  in	  restraining	  the	  president.	  Additionally,	  similar	  to	  Snow	  and	  Neustadt,	  Schlesinger’s	  argument	  is	  rooted	  in	  his	  fundamental	  understanding	  of	  what	  he	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  views	  as	  the	  Framers’	  “intention”	  when	  they	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  presidential	  powers	  in	  the	  constitution.	  However,	  perhaps	  so	  as	  not	  to	  exhaust	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  Framer’s	  intent,	  he	  invokes	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  to	  further	  justify	  his	  argument	  against	  a	  presidency	  with	  too	  much	  centralized	  power.	  “Lincoln,”	  he	  writes,	  “had	  said	  that	  the	  view	  that	  one	  man	  had	  the	  power	  of	  bring	  the	  nation	  to	  war	  placed	  our	  Presidents	  where	  Kings	  had	  always	  stood.”57	  Besides	  finding	  another	  well-­‐known	  figure	  to	  essentially	  endorse	  his	  argument,	  his	  invocation	  of	  Lincoln	  also	  serves	  a	  different	  purpose.	  This	  purpose	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  relatively	  restrained	  executive	  branch	  was	  not	  just	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  Framers,	  but	  rather,	  it	  was	  well	  respected	  and	  commonly	  understood	  pillar	  of	  American	  political	  thought	  from	  1787	  until	  Lincoln	  served	  in	  the	  early	  1860s.	  	  
Indeed,	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  the	  president	  is	  far	  more	  powerful	  than	  his	  formal	  powers	  found	  on	  paper	  would	  suggest.	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  a	  similarity	  between	  Donald	  Snow	  and	  Arthur	  Schlesinger.	  Both	  men	  believe	  that	  the	  president	  is	  stronger	  than	  his	  formal	  powers.	  For	  Snow,	  this	  power	  comes	  through	  the	  means	  of	  the	  president’s	  “informal	  powers.”	  And	  for	  Schlesinger,	  this	  power	  comes	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  “war-­‐making”	  powers	  that	  have	  continually	  been	  provided	  to	  the	  presidency	  without	  appropriate	  checks	  and	  balances,	  and	  thus	  have	  resulted	  in	  an	  era	  of	  an	  “imperial	  presidency.”	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Neustadt	  and	  Stephen	  Skowronek,	  who	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  they	  both	  argue	  that	  the	  president’s	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  30	  formal	  powers	  simply	  are	  not	  enough.	  As	  for	  Neustadt,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  president	  must	  exercise	  his	  ability	  to	  persuade,	  maintain	  a	  solid	  reputation,	  and	  protect	  and	  enhance	  his	  perceived	  public	  image	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  pursue	  his	  agenda.	  Additionally,	  Schlesinger	  puts	  forth	  an	  argument	  that	  the	  president	  is	  so	  strong	  that	  he	  must	  be	  restrained.	  However,	  Skowronek	  argues	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  While	  he	  may	  not	  outright	  say	  that	  the	  president	  is	  “weak”,	  in	  his	  book	  Presidential	  Leadership	  
in	  Political	  Time,	  Skowronek	  argues	  that	  regardless	  of	  a	  president’s	  power,	  he	  is	  still	  restrained	  by	  broad	  structural	  factors	  that	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  out	  of	  his	  control.	  
	  
IV.	  Skowronek:	  Presidential	  Leadership	  in	  Political	  Time	  
Unlike,	  Snow,	  Neustadt,	  and	  Schlesinger,	  Skowronek’s	  analysis	  is	  not	  one	  that	  merely	  focuses	  on	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	  the	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branches.	  Rather,	  as	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  title	  of	  his	  book,	  Skowronek	  seeks	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  presidential	  power	  throughout	  time	  and	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  powers	  follow	  larger	  patterns	  throughout	  “political	  time.”	  	  
	   Indeed,	  Skowronek	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  presidents	  are	  agents	  of	  change.	  However,	  this	  change	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  merely	  achieved	  by	  the	  
	  	   	  31	  amount	  of	  power	  utilized	  or	  amount	  of	  charisma	  possessed	  by	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief.	  While	  those	  traits	  may	  be	  of	  value,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  significant	  value,	  Skowronek	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  a	  president	  faces	  when	  seeking	  to	  legitimize	  his	  actions	  or	  instigate	  change	  is	  where	  that	  particular	  president	  falls	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  broader	  political	  cycle	  throughout	  time.	  This	  cycle	  includes	  variables	  such	  as	  the	  style,	  successes,	  and	  failures	  of	  the	  previous	  president,	  as	  well	  as	  political	  patterns	  preceding	  them.	  	  
	   In	  a	  way,	  Skowronek’s	  argument	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  Neustadt,	  who	  argues	  that	  effective	  presidents	  must	  utilize	  their	  persuasive	  skills	  and	  prestige	  of	  the	  office,	  among	  other	  things,	  to	  instigate	  change	  and	  unleash	  their	  optimum	  potential.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Skowronek	  does	  not	  actually	  refute	  Neustadt’s	  claim,	  but	  actually	  builds	  upon	  it.	  
	   Depending	  on	  the	  conditions	  a	  president	  must	  serve	  in,	  Skowronek	  provides	  four	  examples	  of	  political	  identity	  that	  presidents	  encounter.	  These	  include	  the	  politics	  of	  disjunction,	  reconstruction,	  preemption,	  and	  articulation.	  The	  “politics	  of	  disjunction”	  refers	  to	  a	  time	  in	  which	  a	  president	  offers	  “the	  wrong	  message	  for	  their	  times.”58	  This	  is	  often	  the	  resulted	  by	  being	  affiliated	  with	  a	  particular	  “vulnerable	  regime”	  whose	  unpopularity	  and	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  drags	  them	  down.	  Prominent	  examples	  in	  this	  category	  include	  Jimmy	  Carter	  and	  Herbert	  Hoover.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Skowronek,	  Stephen.	  Presidential	  Leadership	  in	  Political	  Time:	  Reprise	  and	  Reappraisal.	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  2008.	  90.	  
	  	   	  32	  Skowronek	  also	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  though	  both	  of	  these	  men	  (and	  others	  who	  fall	  into	  this	  category)	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  poor	  leaders,	  their	  own	  abilities	  are	  not	  the	  only	  thing	  to	  blame.	  Rather,	  when	  in	  a	  time	  of	  “disjunction”,	  these	  presidents	  had	  a	  near-­‐impossible	  job	  due	  to	  the	  political	  environment	  and	  its	  result	  on	  public	  opinion.	  
	   The	  second	  type	  of	  political	  power,	  the	  “politics	  of	  reconstruction”,	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  being	  in	  the	  right	  place	  at	  the	  right	  time.	  These	  are	  presidents	  who	  enter	  office	  (or	  run	  for	  president)	  on	  the	  pretense	  that	  “the	  old	  order	  is	  indeed	  beyond	  all	  hope.”59	  Such	  leaders	  are	  able	  to	  build	  momentum	  off	  of	  a	  weakening	  regime	  and	  campaign	  (or	  govern)	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  creating	  new	  and	  meaningful	  change.	  Among	  presidents	  that	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  include,	  Abraham	  Lincoln,	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt,	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan.	  	  
	   The	  third	  type	  of	  political	  power	  is	  the	  “politics	  of	  articulation.”	  As	  Skowronek	  notes,	  the	  majority	  of	  presidents	  fall	  within	  this	  category.	  These	  are	  presidents	  that	  are	  affiliated	  with	  a	  somewhat-­‐resilient	  (or	  even	  strong)	  regime,	  and	  tasked	  with	  maintaining	  order	  and	  continuing	  a	  particularly	  vision	  that	  sits	  well	  with	  the	  public.	  Well	  known	  presidents	  that	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  include	  Truman,	  who	  succeeded	  FDR,	  and	  George	  H.W.	  Bush,	  who	  succeeded	  Reagan.	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  Ibid.	  92-­‐93.	  
	  	   	  33	  	   The	  fourth	  type	  of	  political	  power	  is	  the	  “politics	  of	  preemption.”	  This	  unique	  category	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  classify.	  It	  features	  presidents	  who	  are	  relatively	  independent	  -­‐-­‐	  yet	  not	  completely	  detached	  -­‐-­‐	  from	  the	  existing	  regimes	  during	  which	  they	  come	  to	  power.	  The	  candidacy	  of	  Bill	  Clinton,	  who	  fits	  within	  this	  category,	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  category	  when	  campaigned	  on	  “third	  way.”	  Campaigning	  on	  such	  a	  promise	  demonstrated	  that	  Clinton	  acknowledges	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  for	  failing	  to	  stop	  the	  “Republican	  Revolution”	  that	  began	  around	  the	  time	  Reagan	  was	  elected	  in	  1980.60	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  presidents	  in	  this	  category	  to	  embrace	  a	  mainstream	  message	  that	  may	  go	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  what	  their	  particular	  “regime”	  is	  known	  for.	  Other	  presidents	  that	  fall	  into	  this	  category	  include	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  Dwight	  Eisenhower.	  
Skowronek	  contributes	  to	  the	  discussion	  and	  debate	  on	  presidential	  power	  and	  decision-­‐making	  by	  arguing	  that	  regardless	  of	  any	  inherited	  formal	  powers	  or	  informal	  powers,	  the	  president	  is	  still	  often	  restrained	  by	  broad	  structural	  factors	  that	  are	  more	  often	  out	  of	  their	  control.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Snow,	  Neustadt,	  and	  Schlesinger,	  Skowronek’s	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  presidential	  power	  throughout	  time	  and	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  powers	  follow	  larger	  patterns	  throughout	  “political	  time.”	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  Ibid.	  105.	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Chapter	  2	  
	   	  
This	  chapter	  serves	  to	  answer	  what	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  was	  and	  why	  it	  was	  initiated.	  In	  answering	  these	  questions,	  I	  discuss	  the	  context	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  time	  Nixon	  initiated	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  This	  context	  includes	  the	  policy	  of	  “containment”	  in	  the	  20	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  Nixon	  presidency	  and	  the	  role	  it	  played	  in	  the	  Nixon’s	  ultimate	  pursuit	  of	  détente.	  Additionally,	  this	  chapter	  addresses	  the	  broader	  implications	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  
In	  analyzing	  Nixon’s	  foreign	  policy,	  one	  important	  factor	  that	  must	  be	  assessed	  is	  why	  Nixon	  decided	  to	  shift	  to	  such	  a	  dramatic	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  once	  he	  assumed	  the	  presidency.	  Indeed,	  Nixon’s	  desire	  towards	  peace	  and	  a	  new	  direction	  in	  foreign	  policy	  was	  evident	  in	  his	  1969	  inaugural	  address	  when	  he	  declared:	  
“Let	  us	  take	  as	  our	  goal:	  where	  peace	   is	  unknown,	  make	   it	  welcome;	  where	   peace	   is	   fragile,	   make	   it	   strong;	   where	   peace	   is	   temporary,	  make	  it	  permanent.	  After	  a	  period	  of	  confrontation,	  we	  are	  entering	  an	  
	  	   	  36	  era	  of	  negotiation.	  Let	  all	  nations	  know	  that	  during	  the	  administration	  our	  lines	  of	  communication	  will	  be	  open.”61	  	  
Although	  one	  may	  look	  back	  on	  this	  quote	  with	  skepticism	  –	  considering	  Nixon’s	  escalation	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  –	  one	  cannot	  truly	  know	  or	  judge	  his	  intentions	  without	  mere	  speculation.	  If	  taken	  at	  face	  value,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  speech	  coupled	  with	  his	  efforts	  to	  deescalate	  the	  ongoing	  tense	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  are	  indeed	  satisfactory	  examples	  that	  demonstrate	  Nixon’s	  efforts	  were	  part	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  decisive	  strategy	  to	  make	  the	  policy	  of	  Détente	  a	  key	  mandate	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  Furthermore,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  détente,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  Nixon’s	  decision	  making	  process	  through	  a	  lens	  which	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  of	  the	  twenty	  years	  prior	  to	  Nixon’s	  Presidential	  Inauguration	  in	  1969	  and	  where	  that	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  had	  taken	  the	  country.	  
For	  approximately	  twenty	  years	  prior	  to	  Nixon’s	  détente,	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  was	  one	  of	  “containment”,	  a	  policy	  that	  sought	  to	  thwart	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.62	  The	  inception	  of	  this	  policy	  occurred	  with	  President	  Harry	  Truman’s	  March	  12,	  1947	  address	  to	  a	  joint	  session	  of	  Congress	  in	  which	  he	  made	  the	  case	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  Inaugural	  Address	  of	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon.	  Washington	  D.C.	  January	  20th,	  1969.	  (Accessed	  May	  1,	  2016)	  http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-­‐in/address/address-­‐by-­‐richard-­‐m-­‐nixon-­‐1969	  62	  Litwak,	  Robert	  S.	  Détente	  and	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine:	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Pursuit	  of	  
Stability,	  1969-­‐1976.	  CUP	  Archive,	  1986.	  11.	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  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  aid	  the	  Greek	  and	  Turkish	  governments	  against	  communist-­‐led	  or	  influenced	  threats	  and	  takeovers.	  On	  Greece,	  Truman	  said,	  “The	  very	  existence	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  is	  today	  threatened	  by	  the	  terrorist	  activities	  of	  several	  thousand	  armed	  men,	  led	  by	  Communists,	  who	  defy	  the	  government's	  authority	  at	  a	  number	  of	  points,	  particularly	  along	  the	  northern	  boundaries.”63	  And	  on	  Turkey,	  Truman	  noted,	  “Since	  the	  war,	  Turkey	  has	  sought	  financial	  assistance	  from	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  effecting	  that	  modernization	  necessary	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  its	  national	  integrity.	  That	  integrity	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  order	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.”64	  The	  origins	  and	  motives	  of	  this	  policy,	  otherwise	  known	  as	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine,”	  are	  still	  debated.	  It	  is	  certainly	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  speech	  to	  the	  joint	  session	  of	  Congress	  in	  1947	  occurred	  during	  the	  80th	  United	  States	  Congress.	  At	  the	  time,	  Truman,	  a	  Democrat,	  was	  dealing	  with	  Republican	  majorities	  in	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate.	  According	  the	  Deborah	  Larson,	  Truman	  felt	  compelled	  to	  show	  the	  Republicans	  that	  he	  was	  indeed	  a	  strong	  leader	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  arena	  –	  and	  that	  he	  was	  capable	  of	  making	  strong	  and	  sound	  decisions.65	  Regardless	  of	  its	  origins,	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  and	  its	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  stability	  “became	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  an	  American	  policy	  of	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  global	  containment	  which	  viewed	  Communist	  ideology	  and	  Soviet	  Power	  as	  a	  monolithic	  force.”66	  It	  was	  this	  driving	  force,	  Robert	  Litwak	  argues,	  that	  “served	  to	  foster	  a	  psychological	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  American	  conception	  of	  national	  interest,	  traditionally	  a	  minimalist	  notion	  governed	  largely	  by	  economic	  criteria,	  came	  to	  be	  transmuted	  into	  the	  most	  expansive	  and	  ambiguous	  national	  security	  
interest.”67	  	  
President	  Truman’s	  involvement	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  his	  first	  “operational	  signal”	  to	  the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  committed	  to	  pursuing	  this	  policy	  of	  containment.68	  The	  framing	  of	  this	  war	  drew	  on	  the	  threat	  of	  spreading	  communism	  Truman	  warned	  against,	  with	  the	  U.S.	  presenting	  its	  involvement	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  precisely	  to	  prevent	  communist	  North	  Korea	  from	  taking	  over	  South	  Korea.	  Additionally,	  Truman’s	  desire	  for	  involvement	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise	  when	  considering	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  ‘fall	  of	  China”	  to	  communism	  that	  followed	  his	  March	  12,	  1947	  speech	  and	  presaged	  the	  North	  Korean	  invasion	  of	  South	  Korea	  on	  June	  25,	  1950.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Revolution	  certainly	  must	  have	  served	  as	  a	  tremendous	  blow	  to	  the	  Truman	  Administration.	  Only	  two	  and	  a	  half	  years	  after	  his	  1947	  speech	  proposing	  a	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  of	  containment	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  spread	  of	  communism,	  Mao	  Zedong	  officially	  declared	  the	  establishment	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  of	  the	  communist	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China.	  But	  beyond	  what	  was	  happening	  with	  China	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  by	  getting	  involved	  in	  Korea,	  Truman	  sent	  an	  important	  message	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  willing	  to	  “counter	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  by	  proxy	  along	  the	  Eurasian	  periphery.”69	  	  
President	  Truman’s	  successor,	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  campaigned	  in	  1952	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  tremendous	  aggressor	  towards	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  that	  he	  was	  fully	  committed	  to	  containing	  Soviet	  and	  other	  communist	  influence.	  Although	  in	  agreement	  with	  Truman	  that	  communism	  must	  be	  contained,	  Eisenhower’s	  messaging	  was	  certainly	  not	  complementary	  to	  Truman’s	  policies.	  Rather,	  he	  advocated	  for	  a	  stronger	  approach	  to	  confronting	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  new	  national	  security	  policy,	  which	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “New	  Look,”	  involved	  utilizing	  nuclear	  deterrence	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.70	  
An	  interesting	  outcome	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  was	  his	  frugality	  regarding	  his	  approach	  to	  a	  global	  U.S.	  military	  presence.	  The	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  was	  not	  only	  committed	  to	  its	  foreign	  policy	  priorities,	  but	  was	  also	  concerned	  with	  the	  financial	  health	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  commitment	  to	  reduce	  spending.71	  Cutting	  taxes	  and	  spending	  thus	  reduced	  the	  presence	  of	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  American	  conventional	  military	  strength	  around	  the	  globe.	  Due	  to	  this	  decrease	  in	  troops	  around	  the	  world	  and	  the	  benefit	  of	  possessing	  nuclear	  arms,	  Eisenhower	  utilized	  the	  principle	  of	  “M.A.D.”	  (mutually	  assured	  destruction)	  as	  his	  primary	  approach	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  at	  that	  time	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  72An	  additional	  motive	  to	  adjusting	  his	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  Eisenhower	  was	  encountering	  the	  problem	  of	  “harmonizing	  foreign	  and	  defense	  policies	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  this	  confluence	  of	  political	  and	  technological	  circumstance.”73	  
	  By	  failing	  to	  clearly	  distinguish	  the	  United	  States’	  stance	  on	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  warfare,	  Eisenhower	  wanted	  his	  adversaries	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  was	  very	  much	  an	  open	  and	  real	  option	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	  Eisenhower’s	  predecessor,	  Harry	  Truman,	  who	  signed	  off	  on	  the	  use	  of	  two	  atomic	  weapons	  against	  the	  Japanese	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  And	  on	  top	  of	  that,	  Eisenhower	  had	  a	  rather	  brash	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  known	  for	  calling	  of	  communism	  “Godless	  terrorism”,	  and	  for	  his	  borderline	  irresponsible	  statements,	  such	  as	  his	  well	  known	  “massive	  retaliation”	  speech	  given	  in	  1954,	  in	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  which	  Dulles	  argued	  for	  more	  proactive	  American	  foreign	  policy	  approach	  towards	  communism	  that	  depended	  on	  “massive	  retaliatory	  power.”74	  	  
The	  key	  take	  away	  from	  the	  shift	  of	  Truman’s	  foreign	  policy	  to	  Eisenhower’s	  was	  that	  both	  Administrations	  believed	  that	  communism	  was	  a	  threat	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  contained.	  However,	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  –	  and	  especially	  his	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  –	  viewed	  Truman’s	  approach	  towards	  communism	  as	  reactive	  rather	  than	  justifiably	  aggressive	  and	  forthright.75	  More	  specifically,	  Dulles	  believed	  the	  “initial	  Communist	  miscalculations	  in	  Korea	  had	  been	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  American	  declaratory	  power,”	  and	  the	  “global	  extension	  of	  collective	  defense	  arrangements	  would	  affirm	  American	  resolve	  and	  lessen	  the	  likelihood	  of	  such	  political	  miscalculation.”76	  
President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  strayed	  from	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  confrontational	  strategy	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence	  to	  one	  that	  became	  known	  as	  “Flexible	  Response.”	  Kennedy	  realized	  that	  due	  to	  the	  technological	  advances	  since	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  first	  introduced	  the	  idea	  of	  “massive	  retaliation,”	  solely	  relying	  on	  the	  strategy	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence	  was	  not	  a	  sustainable	  strategy.77	  In	  fact,	  Robert	  Litwak	  notes	  that	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  also	  “acknowledged	  the	  need	  for	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  both	  a	  doctrine	  and	  the	  forces	  for	  limited	  war	  as	  it	  sought	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  inherent	  strategic	  immobility	  of	  massive	  retaliation.”78	  However,	  due	  to	  economic	  and	  security	  demands,	  Eisenhower	  failed	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  solution	  to	  “finance	  the	  simultaneous	  development	  of	  a	  limited	  war	  capability	  and	  the	  improvement	  of	  American	  strategic	  capabilities.”	  Therefore,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  tenure	  and	  the	  inauguration	  of	  President	  Kennedy,	  this	  issue	  had	  still	  gone	  unresolved.79	  
	  One	  technological	  advance	  at	  the	  time	  Kennedy	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  included	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  delivery	  systems.	  This	  new	  delivery	  system	  now	  ensured	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  retaliate	  against	  the	  U.S.	  (or	  one	  of	  its	  allies)	  if	  the	  U.S.	  were	  to	  strike	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  obviously	  undermined	  the	  leverage	  the	  U.S.	  once	  possessed.	  Additionally,	  improved	  transportation	  and	  communications	  capabilities	  now	  existed,	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  US	  to	  utilize	  a	  conventional	  military	  presence	  around	  the	  globe	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner.	  	  Due	  to	  these	  technological	  advancements	  complicating	  the	  previous	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  of	  nuclear	  deterrence,	  this	  is	  where	  the	  ‘flexibility’	  of	  the	  “Flexible	  Response”	  strategy	  comes	  into	  play:	  by	  opening	  the	  U.S.	  back	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  fighting	  smaller-­‐scale	  wars	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  nuclear	  weapons,	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  believed	  the	  U.S.	  would	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  more	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  proportional	  deterrence	  options	  at	  their	  expense.80	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  didn’t	  respond	  in	  a	  scenario	  where	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  called	  the	  United	  States’	  bluff	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  launch	  a	  nuclear	  strike,	  it	  could	  potentially	  undermine	  the	  United	  States’	  credibility	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
Following	  the	  assassination	  of	  President	  Kennedy,	  Doris	  Kearns	  writes	  that	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  not	  only	  inherited	  an	  office,	  but	  also	  a	  “world	  view,”	  and	  that	  “beside	  him	  were	  advisers	  who	  shared	  that	  view,	  and	  who	  represented	  that	  difficult	  to	  determine	  group	  of	  men	  –	  the	  foreign	  policy	  establishment	  –	  who	  …	  had	  developed,	  applied,	  and	  believed	  in	  the	  entire	  model	  of	  reasoning	  that	  had	  dominated	  and	  given	  continuity	  to	  American	  foreign	  policy.”81	  Therefore,	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  largely	  continued	  the	  same	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  as	  his	  predecessor,	  believing	  that	  conventional	  war	  could	  still	  be	  fought	  –	  even	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  deploy	  American	  troops	  into	  Vietnam	  is	  an	  example	  of	  his	  commitment	  to	  continuing	  that	  strategy.82	  Additional	  key	  indicators	  of	  Johnson’s	  commitment	  to	  continue	  Kennedy’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  include	  his	  decision	  to	  keep	  the	  same	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  Johnson	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  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Dean	  Rusk,	  and	  other	  key	  national	  security	  advisors	  that	  worked	  under	  and	  advised	  Kennedy,	  such	  as	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  McNamara.	  	  
	  Johnson	  felt	  that	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  must	  be	  fought	  because	  he	  viewed	  it	  as	  “a	  decisive	  test	  case	  both	  of	  American	  will	  and	  the	  instrumentalities	  of	  America.”83	  Robert	  Litwak	  argues	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  fight	  in	  this	  war	  was	  more	  than	  a	  mere	  case	  test.	  He	  writes,	  “[The	  Vietnam	  War]	  was	  the	  logical	  culmination	  (perhaps	  the	  inevitable	  consequence)	  of	  the	  American	  policy-­‐making	  process	  characterized	  above	  –	  that	  is,	  wedding	  of	  the	  undifferentiated,	  well-­‐institutionalized	  image	  of	  the	  international	  system	  with	  an	  instrumental	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy	  problems.”84	  In	  other	  words,	  since	  Truman	  first	  introduced	  this	  policy,	  it	  had	  been	  building	  up	  until	  that	  point.	  
As	  the	  war	  continued,	  support	  for	  it	  in	  the	  United	  States	  waned.	  Johnson	  won	  reelection	  in	  1964,	  but	  soon	  after	  began	  enduring	  domestic	  and	  international	  criticism.	  On	  the	  domestic	  side,	  one	  indication	  of	  Americans’	  frustration	  at	  the	  time	  was	  the	  losses	  that	  Johnson’s	  own	  Democratic	  Party	  suffered	  in	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate	  in	  the	  1966	  Midterm	  Elections	  (although	  still	  maintaining	  slight	  majorities).	  Additionally,	  Johnson’s	  ambitious	  “Great	  Society”	  plan	  was	  being	  attacked	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  aisle.85	  At	  this	  time,	  Jussi	  Hanhimaki	  notes	  that	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  Johnson	  “was	  being	  challenged	  not	  only	  by	  adversaries	  abroad	  and	  critics	  at	  home,	  but	  also	  by	  allies	  as	  French	  president	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle	  distanced	  his	  country	  from	  America’s	  leadership.”86	  These	  building	  complications	  led	  to	  President	  Johnson	  announcing	  on	  March	  31,	  1968	  that	  he	  would	  not	  be	  running	  for	  a	  second	  full	  term	  as	  president.	  	  American	  involvement	  in	  Vietnam	  grew	  from	  200,000	  troops	  in	  1965	  to	  500,000	  in	  1968,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  onward	  until	  the	  last	  troops	  pulled	  out	  on	  April	  30th,	  1975	  -­‐-­‐	  nearly	  7	  years	  after	  President	  Johnson’s	  televised	  announcement.87	  
	  
I.	  What	  was	  Détente?	  
After	  winning	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1968,	  President	  Nixon	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  monumental	  challenge	  of	  keeping	  his	  campaign	  promise	  to	  secure	  “peace	  with	  honor”	  regarding	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  At	  this	  time,	  he	  found	  himself	  in	  what	  Robert	  Litwak	  describes	  as	  “a	  juncture	  in	  history	  in	  which	  chaos	  appeared	  to	  threaten.”	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  general	  public’s	  discontent,	  intellectuals	  and	  foreign	  policy	  elites	  began	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  containment	  was	  not	  working	  and	  offered	  new	  policy	  proposals	  as	  alternatives.	  Securing	  peace	  and	  changing	  the	  course	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  would	  undoubtedly	  require	  strong	  staff	  to	  assist	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  in	  his	  foreign	  policy	  decision-­‐making	  endeavors.	  Among	  the	  most	  notable	  new	  members	  of	  Nixon’s	  foreign	  policy	  team	  included	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  a	  foreign	  policy	  scholar	  who	  had	  been	  actively	  exploring	  foreign	  policy	  alternatives.	  On	  this,	  Robert	  Litwak	  writes	  the	  following	  passage	  regarding	  a	  piece	  Kissinger	  wrote	  a	  number	  of	  years	  earlier:	  
“Henry	   Kissinger,	   then	   serving	   as	   a	   rapporteur	   for	   a	   Council	   on	  Foreign	  Relations	  study	  group,	  followed	  the	  seminal	  works	  on	  limited	  war	  by	  Kaufmann	  and	  Brodie	  with	  an	  exploratory	  piece	  focusing	  upon	  the	   problems	   of	   defending	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘gray	   areas.’	   In	   this	   article,	  whose	  policy	  prescriptions	  bear	  a	  striking	  resemblance	   to	   the	  Nixon	  Doctrine	   proposals	   of	   a	   quarter	   century	   later,	   Kissinger	   argued	   that	  the	  prerequisites	   of	   effective	   local	   action	  by	   the	  United	   States	   lay	   in	  the	  establishment	  of	  stable	  indigenous	  governments.”88	  
Certainly	  Kissinger	  was	  not	  the	  only	  foreign	  policy	  expert	  offering	  proposals	  or	  critiquing	  the	  policy	  of	  containment	  and	  the	  reckless	  rhetoric	  that	  often	  came	  along	  with	  it.	  For	  example,	  Robert	  Osgood	  argued	  that	  the	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  line	  on	  massive	  retaliation	  “was	  the	  logical	  outgrowth	  of	  an	  American	  tradition	  which	  knew	  no	  experience	  of	  war,	  save	  total.”89	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  47	  Considering	  the	  aforementioned	  unpromising	  conditions	  the	  United	  States	  had	  found	  itself	  operating	  in,	  “the	  Nixon	  presidency	  undertook	  a	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  shape	  the	  emerging	  pattern	  of	  international	  relations	  through	  what,	  in	  his	  inaugural	  address,	  Nixon	  defined	  as	  an	  era	  of	  negotiations.”90	  This	  “era	  of	  negotiations”	  also	  included	  the	  forging	  of	  a	  “new	  structure	  of	  peace”,	  which	  sought	  “a	  stable	  equilibrium	  in	  which	  the	  philosophy	  and	  practice	  of	  American	  policy	  would	  be	  altered	  to	  meet	  the	  complexities	  and	  exigencies	  of	  the	  new	  epoch.”91	  This	  newly	  proclaimed	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  became	  known	  as	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  
When	  discussing	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  détente,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  analyze	  the	  influence	  of	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  considering	  that	  Nixon’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Nixon-­‐Kissinger	  Strategy”	  in	  many	  academic	  circles.92	  Additionally,	  analyzing	  Kissinger’s	  philosophy	  is	  necessary	  for	  better	  understanding	  why	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  sought	  to	  pursue	  détente	  –	  a	  rather	  unorthodox	  policy	  –	  considering	  its	  relative	  unpopularity.	  
	  Kissinger’s	  theory,	  further	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  involves	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  global	  equilibrium,	  or	  “balance	  of	  powers.”	  	  	  Evidentially,	  Nixon	  shared	  this	  same	  philosophy	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  presidency.	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  the	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  following	  Time	  magazine	  interview	  on	  January	  3,	  1972	  when	  Nixon	  responded	  to	  the	  critics	  of	  his	  new	  foreign	  policy	  strategy:	  
“We	  must	  remember	  the	  only	  time	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  world	  that	  we	  have	   had	   any	   extended	   periods	   of	   peace	   is	   when	   there	   has	   been	   a	  balance	   of	   power.	   It	   is	   when	   one	   nation	   becomes	   infinitely	   more	  powerful	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  potential	  competitor	  that	  the	  danger	  of	  war	  arises.	  So	  I	  believe	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  is	  powerful.	  I	  think	  it	  will	  be	  a	  safer	  world	  if	  we	  have	  a	  strong,	  healthy	  United	  States,	  Europe,	   Soviet	   Union,	   China,	   Japan,	   each	   balancing	   the	   other,	   not	  playing	  one	  against	  the	  other,	  an	  even	  balance.”93	  As	  the	  quotation	  suggests,	  Kissinger’s	  ideas	  were	  foundational	  for	  the	  policies	  developed	  by	  Nixon	  and	  his	  Administration.	  In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  these	  ideas,	  the	  following	  section	  examines	  Kissinger’s	  (and	  ultimately	  Nixon’s)	  approach	  to	  détente	  according	  to	  his	  realist	  philosophy	  through	  examination	  of	  the	  former’s	  own	  writings.	  
Contrary	  to	  an	  “idealist”	  philosophy	  of	  international	  affairs,	  Kissinger	  believed	  that	  a	  foreign	  policy	  overly	  guided	  by	  moral	  impulses	  and	  steadfast	  ideals	  was	  far	  too	  dangerous.	  Rather,	  he	  realized	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  certain	  interests	  that	  must	  be	  pursued,	  sometimes	  with	  a	  cold	  and	  calculated	  sense	  of	  realism.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  Henry	  Kissinger’s	  approach	  to	  détente,	  one	  must	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  first	  understand	  his	  concept	  of	  “Realpolitik”,	  or	  realism,	  and	  how	  his	  philosophy	  of	  international	  affairs	  shaped	  the	  strategy	  of	  détente.	  
Henry	  Kissinger’s	  well-­‐known	  theory	  of	  “world	  order”	  is	  drawn	  from	  Europe’s	  history	  of	  containing	  independent	  nation-­‐states.	  Each	  of	  these	  states	  held	  sovereignty	  over	  their	  own	  religion,	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  other	  issues	  within	  their	  own	  territory.	  These	  states	  would	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  other	  states,	  and	  knowledgeable	  statesmen	  would	  ideally	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  maintaining	  order.	  These	  statesmen,	  or	  “diplomats”,	  would	  focus	  on	  national	  interests	  and	  work	  towards	  a	  global	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  nations.	  More	  specifically,	  as	  Robert	  Litwak	  notes,	  “In	  [Kissinger’s]	  A	  World	  Restored,	  praise	  is	  reserved	  for	  those	  post-­‐Napoleonic	  statesmen,	  specifically	  Metternich	  and	  Castlereagh,	  who	  recognized	  and	  accepted	  the	  finite	  limits	  of	  their	  power	  and	  who	  subsequently	  chose	  diplomacy,	  buttressed	  by	  the	  adroit	  application	  of	  force,	  to	  achieve	  their	  objectives.”94	  
In	  order	  to	  maintain	  “world	  order,”	  Kissinger	  firmly	  believes	  that	  a	  global	  equilibrium,	  or	  ‘balance	  of	  power’,	  must	  exist	  between	  nations.	  On	  this,	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “The	  balance-­‐of-­‐power	  system	  did	  not	  purport	  to	  avoid	  crises	  or	  even	  wars.	  When	  working	  properly,	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  limit	  both	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  dominate	  others	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  conflicts.	  Its	  goal	  was	  not	  peace	  so	  much	  as	  stability	  and	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  moderation.”95	  As	  addressed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  these	  goals	  of	  stability	  and	  moderation	  explain	  why	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  sought	  a	  period	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China.	  	  
As	  pragmatists,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  understood	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  simply	  strong-­‐arm	  other	  countries	  into	  doing	  whatever	  was	  in	  its	  best	  interests.	  Consequently,	  the	  critics	  of	  détente	  were	  unhappy	  with	  the	  Nixon	  Administration’s	  decision	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Soviets.96	  This	  criticism	  was	  fueled	  by	  the	  ideological	  belief	  that	  the	  West	  should	  not	  and	  cannot	  compromise	  with	  communists.	  However,	  Kissinger	  believed	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  idealistic	  mindset	  was	  not	  a	  practical	  long-­‐term	  strategy.	  He	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  world’s	  constantly	  changing	  power	  dynamics.	  Certainly	  stemming	  from	  the	  lessons	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “What	  is	  new	  about	  the	  emerging	  world	  order	  is	  that,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  United	  States	  can	  neither	  withdraw	  from	  the	  world	  nor	  dominate	  it.	  America	  cannot	  change	  the	  way	  it	  has	  perceived	  its	  role	  throughout	  its	  history,	  nor	  should	  it	  want	  to.”97	  I	  find	  that	  this	  passage,	  written	  quite	  a	  while	  after	  Kissinger’s	  tenure	  as	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  perfectly	  encapsulates	  his	  approach	  towards	  détente.	  I	  would	  summarize	  this	  theory	  as	  follows:	  Realpolitik	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  interests	  of	  others.	  Aggression	  and	  bravado	  can	  only	  go	  so	  far.	  Finally,	  at	  some	  point,	  a	  nation	  must	  show	  accommodation	  and	  engage	  in	  diplomacy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Kissinger,	  Henry.	  Diplomacy.	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2012.	  21.	  96	  Ibid.	  740,	  746.	  97	  Ibid.	  19.	  
	  	   	  51	  
II.	  Détente	  in	  Action:	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  
Due	  to	  Nixon’s	  desire	  to	  ease	  Cold	  War	  tensions,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  been	  on	  his	  Administration’s	  radar	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  At	  that	  time,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  feud	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  dealing	  with	  over	  500,000	  troops	  entangled	  in	  Vietnam,	  broken	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Arab	  countries	  after	  the	  1967	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war,	  and	  non-­‐existent	  relations	  with	  China.	  	  Regarding	  the	  Administration’s	  approach	  to	  removing	  US	  troops	  from	  Vietnam,	  Nixon	  hoped	  that	  by	  diplomatically	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (and	  eventually	  China),	  both	  of	  the	  communist	  superpowers	  would	  begin	  to	  reduce	  their	  support	  for	  their	  communist	  ally,	  North	  Vietnam.	  In	  an	  ideal	  situation,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  believed	  that	  this	  could	  potentially	  lead	  to	  an	  expedited	  American	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  war.	  And	  while	  Nixon	  was	  also	  more	  generally	  interested	  in	  a	  broad-­‐based	  opening	  of	  diplomacy,	  this	  seemed	  like	  an	  ideal	  time	  to	  try	  something	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Kissinger	  had	  informed	  Nixon	  early	  on	  in	  his	  first	  term	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  interested	  in	  engagement,	  and	  that	  they	  should	  indulge	  them	  and	  “come	  to	  grips	  with	  the	  real	  sources	  of	  engagement,	  notably	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  but	  also	  in	  Vietnam.”98	  Furthermore,	  the	  timing	  seemed	  just	  right,	  as	  Kissinger	  insisted	  “the	  new	  administration	  could	  use	  diplomacy	  to	  manage	  Soviet	  behavior,	  to	  channel	  it	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  into	  certain	  directions	  by	  using	  the	  policy	  of	  linkage.”99	  In	  the	  Forward	  to	  Soviet-­‐
American	  Relations:	  The	  Détente	  Years	  (1969-­‐1972),	  Kissinger	  provides	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  “linkage”	  with	  the	  Soviets	  through	  a	  so-­‐called	  “channel”	  and	  how	  this	  channel	  had	  to	  be	  handled	  with	  a	  very	  cautious	  and	  calculated	  strategy.	  
The	  channel	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Americans	  began	  when	  President	  Nixon	  met	  with	  Anatoly	  Dobrynin,	  then	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  February	  of	  1969	  and	  explained	  to	  him	  that	  he	  wished	  to	  create	  a	  direct	  White	  House	  link	  to	  top	  Soviet	  officials	  regarding	  the	  pressing	  issues	  of	  the	  time.	  The	  most	  frequent	  use	  of	  this	  channel	  was	  between	  Dobrynin	  and	  Kissinger.	  Kissinger	  writes	  of	  the	  meetings,	  “At	  first,	  the	  Channel	  dealt	  with	  the	  general	  state	  of	  the	  U.S.	  -­‐	  Soviet	  relationship,	  Vietnam,	  and,	  after	  the	  arms	  control	  negotiations	  began,	  discussions	  of	  the	  strategic	  views	  of	  each	  side.	  Since	  we	  were	  determined	  to	  avoid	  crises	  developing	  by	  their	  own	  momentum,	  we	  resorted	  to	  ‘thinking	  out	  loud’	  sessions,	  designed	  to	  enable	  Soviet	  leaders	  to	  study	  our	  thinking	  informally	  before	  being	  confronted	  with	  specific	  proposals.”100	  Opening	  up	  a	  channel	  with	  the	  Soviets	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  grand	  strategy	  that	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  executed.	  This	  “era	  of	  negotiations”	  allowed	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  regain	  its	  diplomatic	  legitimacy	  during	  the	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  Vietnam	  War.	  Additionally,	  Nixon	  believed	  that	  the	  building	  tension	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  would	  persuade	  the	  Soviets	  to	  consider	  negotiating	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  so	  they	  would	  not	  have	  enemies	  on	  two	  separate	  fronts.	  With	  opening	  up	  relations	  with	  the	  Chinese	  in	  the	  back	  of	  their	  minds,	  Kissinger	  and	  Nixon	  believed	  that	  these	  talks	  with	  the	  Soviets,	  although	  risky,	  could	  give	  them	  leverage	  in	  the	  future	  of	  Sino-­‐American	  relations.	  Ultimately,	  this	  hypothesis	  proved	  correct.	  
An	  essential	  aspect	  of	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Soviets	  was	  that	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  did	  not	  see	  the	  relationship	  as	  “zero	  sum.”	  As	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “[Nixon]	  endeavored	  to	  weave	  together	  all	  of	  the	  many	  elements	  of	  the	  superpower	  relationship	  into	  an	  overall	  approach	  that	  was	  neither	  totally	  confrontational	  nor	  totally	  conciliatory.”101	  Their	  plan	  was	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Soviets	  on	  areas	  of	  mutual	  agreement,	  then	  use	  their	  cooperation	  as	  “leverage	  to	  modify	  Soviet	  behavior.”	  It	  was	  this	  way	  of	  working,	  Kissinger	  writes,	  that	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  understood	  détente.	  
However,	  the	  linkage	  between	  Washington	  and	  Moscow	  certainly	  had	  its	  challenges.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  example	  is	  arms	  control	  policy.	  Though	  conventional	  wisdom	  would	  suggest	  that	  mutually	  assured	  destruction	  (M.A.D.)	  would	  deter	  any	  possible	  nuclear	  threat,	  Kissinger	  notes	  that	  there	  was	  an	  ongoing	  fear	  of	  a	  preemptive	  strike	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  airplanes	  and	  relatively	  few	  locations	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  contained	  most	  of	  the	  nuclear	  weapons.102	  These	  increasing	  fears	  lead	  to	  much	  domestic	  political	  pressure	  that	  pulled	  Nixon	  in	  many	  different	  directions.	  And	  although	  the	  Americans	  and	  Soviets	  were	  able	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  and	  sign	  the	  first	  Strategic	  Arms	  Limitation	  Treaty	  (SALT	  I),	  the	  SALT	  II	  treaty	  did	  not	  end	  in	  success.	  Many	  media	  sources	  at	  the	  time	  attributed	  the	  failure	  of	  SALT	  II	  to	  Nixon’s	  overambitious	  attempt	  to	  tie	  strategic	  arms	  negotiations	  with	  other	  political	  issues.103	  	  
Though	  subject	  to	  many	  hiccups,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  period	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  ultimately	  a	  success.	  By	  1971,	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  still	  largely	  seen	  as	  a	  foe	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  with	  nearly	  half	  of	  U.S.	  citizens	  (48%)	  displaying	  deep	  skepticism	  of	  working	  with	  the	  Soviets.104	  	  Opening	  up	  the	  so-­‐called	  “channel”	  allowed	  Nixon	  to	  negotiate	  and	  make	  his	  policy	  positions	  clear.	  Though	  the	  signing	  of	  SALT	  I	  was	  mostly	  symbolic,	  it	  represented	  a	  mutual	  effort	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  work	  towards	  cooperation	  and	  coexistence.	  Additionally,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Kissinger/	  Nixon	  strategy,	  the	  timing	  of	  opening	  up	  U.S.	  relations	  with	  China	  successfully	  applied	  pressure	  on	  the	  Soviets.	  As	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “Linkage	  began	  working	  because	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  managed	  to	  create	  a	  major	  incentive	  for	  Soviet	  moderation	  by	  achieving	  a	  dramatic	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  opening	  to	  China.”105	  This	  opening	  put	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  a	  position	  where	  they	  felt	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  have	  two	  enemies	  on	  two	  different	  fronts.	  Therefore,	  as	  the	  following	  section	  explains,	  improving	  Sino-­‐American	  relations	  became	  vital	  to	  the	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger’s	  strategy.	  
	  
III.	  Implementing	  Détente	  as	  a	  Strategy:	  China	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  accomplishment	  achieved	  through	  reaching	  out	  to	  China	  was	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Communiqué.	  The	  Communiqué	  acted	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  a	  new	  Sino-­‐American	  relationship	  that	  clearly	  defined	  the	  countries’	  ideological	  agreements	  and	  disagreements	  and	  provided	  a	  framework	  needed	  to	  work	  together	  on	  areas	  of	  common	  accord.	  The	  document	  affirmed	  that	  first,	  progress	  toward	  the	  normalization	  of	  relations	  between	  China	  and	  the	  U.S.	  is	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  countries;	  Second,	  both	  countries	  wish	  to	  reduce	  the	  danger	  of	  any	  international	  military	  conflict;	  And	  third,	  neither	  country	  should	  seek	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  and	  each	  is	  opposed	  to	  efforts	  by	  any	  other	  country	  to	  establish	  such	  hegemony;	  and	  4.	  Neither	  country	  is	  prepared	  to	  negotiate	  on	  behalf	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  of	  any	  third	  party	  or	  to	  enter	  into	  agreements	  or	  understandings	  with	  the	  other	  directed	  at	  other	  states.106	  
	   After	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  communiqué,	  Kissinger	  and	  Nixon	  felt	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  in	  a	  promising	  position	  with	  China	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Chinese	  feared	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  more	  than	  they	  did	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  China	  were	  to	  act	  in	  its	  own	  self-­‐interest,	  they	  would	  almost	  be	  required	  to	  work	  with	  the	  US.	  Meanwhile,	  by	  successfully	  reaching	  out	  to	  the	  Chinese,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  applied	  the	  kind	  of	  needed	  pressure	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  required	  them	  to	  rethink	  their	  hostility	  towards	  China.	  If	  the	  Soviets	  initiated	  a	  war	  with	  the	  Chinese,	  it	  would	  likely	  only	  result	  in	  strengthening	  the	  newly	  developed	  U.S./China	  relationship.	  Therefore,	  as	  Kissinger	  notes,	  “The	  Soviet	  Union’s	  best	  option	  became	  seeking	  its	  own	  relaxation	  of	  tensions	  with	  the	  United	  States.”107	  	  
	   Ultimately,	  in	  showing	  arguably	  the	  greatest	  symbol	  of	  détente,	  Nixon’s	  trip	  to	  China	  was	  indeed	  a	  “week	  that	  changed	  the	  world”.	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War	  in	  the	  late	  1940’s	  when	  the	  Communist	  Party	  came	  to	  power,	  Sino-­‐American	  relations	  had	  been	  completely	  frozen.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Nixon	  Administration’s	  strategy	  to	  open	  up	  relations	  with	  the	  Chinese	  took	  the	  world	  by	  surprise,	  considering	  that	  Nixon	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  being	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐
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  communist.	  And	  although	  Nixon’s	  visit	  did	  not	  officially	  restore	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  China,	  it	  put	  the	  two	  countries	  on	  a	  new,	  positive	  track.	  	  
	   The	  greatest	  lesson	  learned	  from	  opening	  a	  period	  of	  détente	  with	  China	  was	  that	  diplomacy	  is	  vital	  to	  peace	  and	  cooperation.	  Both	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  took	  a	  major	  risk.	  However,	  they	  were	  aware	  that	  if	  the	  summit	  went	  well,	  both	  countries	  would	  benefit	  from	  cooperation.	  On	  nearly	  every	  issue	  that	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  disagreed	  on	  prior	  to	  Nixon’s	  visit,	  they	  continued	  to	  disagree	  on	  after.	  But	  more	  importantly,	  opening	  up	  a	  dialogue	  allowed	  the	  U.S.	  and	  China	  to	  come	  together	  on	  areas	  of	  mutual	  interest.	  Détente	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  tool	  needed	  in	  order	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  engage	  actively	  with	  the	  two	  Communist	  superpowers.	  As	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “The	  Nixon	  Administration’s	  concept	  of	  international	  relations	  was	  far	  more	  realistic	  than	  the	  one	  it	  had	  inherited	  and,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  represented	  a	  necessary	  adjustment	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.”108	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  time	  –	  and	  the	  policy	  of	  containment,	  in	  particular	  –	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  Nixon’s	  pursuit	  of	  détente.	  Approximately	  twenty	  years	  before	  the	  Nixon	  presidency,	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  was	  one	  of	  “containment.”	  The	  policy	  of	  containment,	  which	  had	  taken	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  forms	  from	  the	  Truman	  Administration	  to	  the	  Johnson	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  Administration,	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  The	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  arguably	  served	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  containment.	  	  
The	  policy	  of	  détente	  was	  a	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  intended	  to	  forge	  a	  “new	  structure	  of	  peace”	  and	  sought	  “a	  stable	  equilibrium	  in	  which	  the	  philosophy	  and	  practice	  of	  American	  policy	  would	  be	  altered	  to	  meet	  the	  complexities	  and	  exigencies	  of	  the	  new	  epoch.”109	  Henry	  Kissinger	  played	  an	  extremely	  crucial	  role	  in	  shaping	  (and	  ultimately	  pursuing)	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  Kissinger’s	  theory	  of	  international	  affairs	  –	  which	  was	  shared	  by	  Nixon	  –	  invoked	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  global	  equilibrium,	  or	  “balance	  of	  powers.”	  Kissinger	  believed	  that	  when	  working	  properly,	  a	  system	  of	  balanced	  powers	  limited	  “both	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  dominate	  others	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  conflicts.	  Its	  goal	  was	  not	  peace	  so	  much	  as	  stability	  and	  moderation.”110	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Chapter	  3	  	  	  	  	   This	  chapter	  addresses	  why	  Nixon	  was	  able	  to	  initiate	  this	  drastic	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  at	  this	  particular	  moment.	  This	  is	  addressed	  by	  analyzing	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  conditions	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  will	  lead	  to	  me	  arguing	  that	  both	  of	  these	  conditions	  were	  crucial	  in	  providing	  Nixon	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China.	  More	  specifically,	  in	  terms	  of	  domestic	  conditions,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  domestic	  unrest	  created	  conditions	  that	  allowed	  Nixon	  to	  run	  a	  presidential	  campaign	  primary	  focused	  on	  addressing	  domestic	  issues.	  Furthermore,	  Nixon	  acknowledged	  the	  overwhelming	  public	  opinion	  that	  surrounded	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  recognized	  that	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  a	  newer,	  smarter	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  international	  conditions	  that	  allowed	  Nixon	  to	  initially	  pursue	  détente,	  I	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  Nixon	  in	  providing	  the	  critical	  first	  steps	  in	  an	  ongoing	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Second,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  border	  dispute	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  created	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  China.	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I.	  The	  Domestic	  Context	  of	  Détente	  	  
Once	  the	  1968	  presidential	  elections	  were	  in	  full	  swing,	  Americans	  were	  hungry	  for	  change.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  debacle	  and	  ongoing	  anti-­‐war	  movement,	  the	  country	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement	  and	  had	  just	  witnessed	  the	  assassinations	  of	  Dr.	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  in	  April	  1968	  and	  Bobby	  Kennedy	  only	  two	  months	  later.	  Essentially,	  the	  fabric	  of	  civil	  society	  appeared	  to	  bursting	  at	  the	  seams.	  This	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  American	  society	  and	  fueled	  the	  anger	  and	  discontent	  directed	  towards	  America’s	  foreign	  policy	  strategy,	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  ongoing	  failure	  in	  Vietnam	  that	  claimed	  so	  many	  American	  lives.	  Furthermore,	  Hanhimaki	  writes	  that	  there	  was	  a	  basic	  question	  that	  struck	  fear	  into	  the	  minds	  of	  U.S.	  policymakers:	  “How	  does	  one	  reconcile	  the	  glaring	  contradiction	  between	  the	  idea	  of	  America	  as	  a	  model	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  America	  as	  a	  segregationist,	  racist	  society?”111	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  general	  discontent	  among	  the	  American	  public	  showed	  that	  there	  was	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  United	  States’	  domestic	  and	  international	  policy.	  	  
The	  1968	  presidential	  elections	  coincided	  with	  the	  American	  public’s	  increasing	  anger	  and	  frustration	  over	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  Nixon	  believed	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  disaster	  might	  be	  enough	  to	  get	  a	  Republican	  elected	  to	  the	  White	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  House.112	  Nixon’s	  1968	  presidential	  campaign	  was	  very	  much	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  bringing	  Americans	  together	  through	  an	  emphasis	  of	  focusing	  on	  domestic	  political	  issues.	  For	  example,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  one	  issue	  included	  putting	  a	  stop	  to	  increasing	  rampant	  crime.113	  This	  campaign	  strategy	  of	  emphasizing	  domestic	  issues	  was	  certainly	  noteworthy.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  strategy,	  of	  course,	  was	  because	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  was	  a	  crucial	  issue	  in	  American	  political	  discourse	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  1968	  Presidential	  Elections.	  Nixon’s	  inspiring	  messaging	  throughout	  the	  campaign	  sought	  to	  be	  the	  much-­‐needed	  antidote	  to	  alleviate	  some	  of	  the	  rising	  tension	  in	  American	  society.	  At	  the	  time,	  domestically,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  deeply	  entrenched	  in	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  era	  of	  unrest	  and	  “counterculture,”	  which,	  among	  other	  things,	  included	  several	  years	  of	  ongoing	  civil	  rights	  and	  anti-­‐war	  protests	  that	  often	  turned	  violent,	  the	  assassination	  of	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.	  on	  April	  4,	  1968,	  and	  the	  assassination	  of	  Bobby	  Kennedy	  two	  months	  later.	  	  
Furthermore,	  although	  Nixon	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  the	  “foreign	  policy	  expert”	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  he	  was	  advised	  to	  soften	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War.114	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  addition	  to	  campaigning	  as	  a	  populist	  on	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  Nixon	  placed	  a	  particularly	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  domestic	  issues	  in	  the	  U.S.	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  Nixon	  recognized	  this	  desire	  for	  change,	  and	  adjusted	  his	  positions	  based	  on	  public	  opinion.	  	  
Similar	  to	  Nixon’s	  own	  U.S.	  Senate	  campaign	  eighteen	  years	  prior,	  Maryland	  Governor	  Spiro	  Agnew,	  Nixon’s	  running	  mate,	  painted	  Democratic	  Nominee	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  as	  ‘soft	  on	  communism.’115	  This,	  combined	  with	  the	  baggage	  of	  disastrous	  ongoing	  Vietnam	  War	  –	  a	  war	  intensified	  by	  the	  Administration	  in	  which	  Humphrey	  had	  been	  a	  part	  of	  –	  put	  Humphrey	  on	  the	  defensive.	  Nixon	  emerged	  as	  the	  frontrunner	  and	  ultimately	  defeated	  Humphrey	  by	  a	  narrow	  margin	  of	  victory	  in	  the	  popular	  vote,	  but	  a	  3	  to	  2	  margin	  of	  victory	  in	  the	  Electoral	  College.	  	  
With	  Nixon	  now	  President,	  it	  was	  time	  for	  him	  to	  make	  good	  on	  his	  promise	  to	  end	  America’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  However,	  after	  being	  sworn	  in	  as	  President	  in	  1969,	  Nixon	  had	  more	  on	  his	  mind	  than	  ending	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  In	  addition	  to	  dealing	  with	  over	  500,000	  troops	  in	  Vietnam,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  feud	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  broken	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Arab	  countries	  after	  the	  1967	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war,	  and	  non-­‐existent	  relations	  with	  China.	  This	  meant	  he	  needed	  to	  assemble	  a	  wise	  and	  experienced	  team	  of	  foreign	  policy	  advisors.	  Nixon	  tapped	  foreign	  affairs	  scholar	  Henry	  Kissinger	  as	  his	  National	  Security	  Advisor.	  At	  the	  time,	  Kissinger	  was	  known	  in	  Republican	  circles	  due	  to	  his	  advising	  of	  Governor	  Nelson	  Rockefeller	  through	  his	  three	  separate	  presidential	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  campaigns	  (1960,	  1964,	  and	  1968).	  In	  his	  memoir,	  White	  House	  Years,	  Kissinger	  wrote	  that	  at	  the	  time,	  he	  shared	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  find	  a	  strategy	  to	  exit	  Vietnam,	  as	  it	  deeply	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  the	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  global	  context.116	  Kissinger	  later	  became	  President	  Nixon’s	  (and	  Ford’s)	  Secretary	  of	  State	  and	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  the	  chief	  architect	  of	  Nixon’s	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  principally	  included	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.117	  Considering	  the	  unpromising	  domestic	  and	  international	  conditions	  the	  United	  States	  had	  found	  itself	  in,	  “the	  Nixon	  presidency	  undertook	  a	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  shape	  the	  emerging	  pattern	  of	  international	  relations	  through	  what,	  in	  his	  inaugural	  address,	  Nixon	  defined	  as	  an	  era	  of	  negotiations.”118	  This	  “era	  of	  negotiations”	  began	  what	  would	  become	  known	  as	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  	  
	  
II.	  The	  International	  Context	  of	  Détente	  	   What	  added	  a	  rather	  surprising	  element	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  détente	  was	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  its	  timing.	  In	  the	  years	  following	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  when	  the	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  between	  the	  two	  superpowers	  was	  arguably	  at	  it	  highest	  point	  of	  tension,	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  suddenly	  arose	  and	  surprised	  the	  international	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  community	  by	  seeking	  to	  create	  a	  more	  secure	  international	  environment.	  While	  Kennedy’s	  effort	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  unheard	  of	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  it	  did	  not	  necessarily	  signal	  a	  definite	  departure	  from	  the	  current	  state	  of	  Soviet-­‐American	  relations	  of	  the	  time.	  	  
When	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  began	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  two	  countries	  were	  still	  largely	  hostile	  towards	  each	  other.	  Opening	  up	  talks	  with	  the	  Soviets	  was	  also	  politically	  difficult	  to	  do	  considering	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  mindset	  that	  dominated	  the	  American	  narrative.119	  Conventional	  wisdom	  suggested	  that	  the	  Soviets	  could	  either	  be	  our	  adversaries	  or	  allies.	  And	  because	  they	  most	  certainly	  were	  not	  our	  allies,	  the	  idea	  of	  working	  with	  them	  or	  simply	  seeking	  areas	  of	  mutual	  interest	  was	  viewed	  as	  appeasement,	  and	  thus,	  simply	  out	  of	  the	  question.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  international	  conditions	  Nixon	  operated	  in,	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  understand	  that	  Richard	  Nixon	  was	  not	  the	  first	  President	  to	  pursue	  an	  easing	  of	  tensions	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  Nixon	  to	  provide	  the	  critical	  first	  steps	  for	  an	  ongoing	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  administration,	  a	  critical	  point	  of	  conflict	  occurred	  in	  October	  of	  1962	  when	  American	  U-­‐2	  spy	  planes	  flew	  over	  Cuba	  and	  discovered	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  Soviet	  ballistic	  missile	  sites.	  This	  discovery	  resulted	  in	  Kennedy	  appearing	  on	  national	  television	  to	  inform	  the	  American	  public	  of	  what	  had	  been	  discovered.	  In	  addition	  to	  demanding	  that	  the	  Soviet	  missiles	  be	  removed,	  President	  Kennedy	  ultimately	  ended	  up	  quarantining	  Cuba	  to	  “prevent	  Soviet	  shipments	  from	  reaching	  their	  destination.”120	  In	  the	  days	  following	  the	  televised	  addressed,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  appeared	  to	  be	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  war.	  However,	  in	  the	  end,	  then-­‐Attorney	  General	  Robert	  Kennedy	  was	  able	  to	  strike	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  required	  the	  Soviets	  to	  remove	  their	  missiles	  from	  Cuba	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  Americans	  removing	  their	  missiles	  from	  Turkey.	  This	  conflict-­‐turned-­‐compromise	  was	  a	  crucial	  turning	  point	  in	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Regarding	  what	  both	  countries	  must	  have	  known,	  Jussi	  Hanhimäki	  writes	  that	  “[w]ar	  against	  each	  other	  was	  simply	  not	  an	  option;	  avoiding	  situations	  that	  might	  provoke	  a	  war	  with	  catastrophic	  consequences	  –	  nuclear	  annihilation	  –	  was	  a	  necessity.”121	  	  
The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  was	  not	  the	  first	  administration	  to	  pursue	  a	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  tensions	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Had	  Kennedy	  not	  been	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Soviets	  during	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  would	  have	  likely	  not	  been	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  in	  the	  position	  to	  initiate	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  This,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  ultimately	  opened	  up	  a	  line	  of	  communication	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  government	  on	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  side	  that	  previously	  had	  not	  been	  utilized	  by	  the	  American	  and	  Soviet	  leadership.	  Specifically,	  this	  “line	  of	  communication”	  I	  speak	  of	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  “channel”	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  project.	  Indeed,	  the	  “channel”	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  because	  it	  allowed	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  leadership	  to	  handle	  their	  negotiations	  in	  a	  careful	  and	  cautious	  way	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  give	  each	  side	  the	  opportunity	  to	  informally	  study	  the	  other’s	  way	  of	  thinking.122	  
	  The	  experiences	  of	  the	  Kennedy	  and	  Johnson	  Administrations	  both	  served	  as	  ‘models’	  for	  Nixon	  on	  how	  to	  approach	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  while	  also	  creating	  conditions	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  that	  were	  necessary	  for	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  détente	  at	  the	  time	  he	  did.	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Kennedy’s	  handling	  of	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  prepared	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  due	  the	  aforementioned	  conditions	  Kennedy’s	  handling	  of	  the	  situation	  had	  created	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Kennedy’s	  ‘model’	  of	  approach	  was	  one	  that	  understood	  that	  both	  countries	  had	  vested	  interests	  at	  stake,	  and	  he	  was	  eventually	  able	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  and	  come	  to	  an	  agreement.	  His	  approach	  during	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  most	  certainly	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  friendship	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  but	  it	  did	  show	  the	  potential	  for	  Americans	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  and	  Soviets	  to	  work	  together.	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  next	  section	  explains,	  the	  experiences	  of	  President	  Kennedy	  and	  Johnson	  were	  not	  the	  only	  conditions	  set	  in	  place	  that	  were	  pivotal	  for	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  détente.	  When	  Nixon	  assumed	  the	  presidency,	  tensions	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  quickly	  began	  to	  escalate.	  
In	  March	  of	  1969,	  only	  two	  months	  after	  Nixon’s	  inauguration,	  a	  border	  dispute	  that	  took	  place	  along	  the	  Ussuri	  River	  in	  Siberia	  led	  to	  severe	  tensions	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  the	  Chinese.	  U.S.	  intelligence	  had	  reasonable	  evidence	  to	  suspect	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  gearing	  up	  for	  a	  possible	  ground	  invasion.	  Nixon	  feared	  that	  the	  “Soviet	  military	  intervention	  in	  China	  would	  signal	  the	  most	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  global	  balance	  of	  power	  since	  the	  Cuban	  missile	  crisis.”123	  Indeed,	  their	  suspicions	  were	  not	  far	  off.	  A	  secret	  meeting	  between	  Chinese	  Premier	  Zhou	  En-­‐Lai	  and	  Alexei	  Kosygin	  took	  place	  one	  month	  after	  the	  border	  dispute,	  and	  the	  two	  countries	  agreed	  to	  draw	  back	  just	  before	  a	  war	  likely	  would	  have	  broken	  out.124	  Nixon	  saw	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  Chinese	  in	  order	  to	  modify	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  dialogue.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  dialogue	  was	  to	  determine	  (and	  potentially	  transform)	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	  the	  USSR,	  China,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  As	  Kissinger	  notes,	  if	  he	  and	  Nixon	  were	  correct	  in	  their	  assumption	  that	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  feared	  each	  other	  more	  than	  they	  feared	  the	  U.S.,	  “an	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  unprecedented	  opportunity	  for	  American	  diplomacy	  would	  come	  into	  being.”125	  Therefore,	  the	  U.S.	  began	  to	  show	  its	  willingness	  to	  open	  up	  to	  China	  by	  implementing	  a	  number	  of	  strategic	  initiatives	  including	  eliminating	  the	  travel	  ban	  to	  the	  PRC	  and	  relaxing	  strict	  trade	  policies.	  Though	  seemingly	  trivial,	  these	  gestures	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  symbolic	  and	  convey	  the	  United	  States’	  willingness	  to	  ease	  existing	  Sino-­‐American	  tensions.	  
At	  this	  time,	  American	  public	  opinion	  on	  China	  varied	  greatly.	  However,	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger	  were	  firm	  believers	  that	  opening	  up	  relations	  with	  the	  Chinese	  would	  be	  a	  positive	  strategic	  move	  that	  would	  give	  the	  United	  States	  leverage	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  particularly	  involving	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Kremlin.	  They	  believed	  that	  “[e]xcluding	  a	  country	  of	  the	  magnitude	  of	  China	  from	  America’s	  diplomatic	  options	  meant	  that	  America	  was	  operating	  internationally	  with	  one	  hand	  tied	  behind	  its	  back.”126	  These	  heightened	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  tensions	  included	  the	  Soviet	  Leadership	  viewing	  Mao’s	  China	  as	  a	  “clear	  and	  present	  danger.”127	  Interestingly,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  view	  that	  states	  that	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  was	  not	  solely	  interested	  in	  leveraging	  American	  power	  against	  Soviet	  power	  simply	  by	  opening	  up	  relations	  with	  China.	  Rather,	  as	  scholars	  like	  Evelyn	  Goh	  write,	  “[opening	  up	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  China]	  would	  favor	  a	  strong	  PRC	  which	  help	  act	  as	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  counterweight	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union.”128	  Goh’s	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  was	  willing	  to	  increase	  Chinese	  power	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  Soviet	  power.	  This	  plays	  right	  into	  the	  Chapter	  2	  discussion	  about	  Nixon	  and	  Kissinger’s	  philosophy	  of	  a	  global	  equilibrium,	  or	  “balance	  of	  power.”	  
	   Additionally,	  in	  a	  pivotal	  moment,	  Nixon	  issued	  a	  statement	  that	  showed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  not	  stand	  idly	  by	  if	  the	  Soviets	  were	  to	  attack	  the	  Chinese:	  
“We	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  exploit	  for	  our	  own	  advantage	  the	  hostility	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic.	  Ideological	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  Communist	  giants	  are	  not	  our	  affair.	  We	  could	  not	  fail	  to	  be	  concerned,	  however,	  with	  an	  escalation	  of	  this	  quarrel	  into	  a	  massive	  breach	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security.”129	  
This	  statement	  conveyed	  a	  number	  of	  things.	  However,	  most	  importantly,	  it	  showed	  the	  Chinese	  (and	  the	  Soviets)	  that	  the	  U.S.	  recognized	  China’s	  independence	  as	  significant	  to	  the	  global	  balance	  of	  power.	  Kissinger	  adds	  to	  this,	  “Nixon’s	  warning	  to	  the	  Soviets	  was	  also	  a	  tangible	  expression	  of	  his	  Administration’s	  new	  emphasis	  on	  basing	  American	  policy	  on	  the	  careful	  analysis	  of	  the	  national	  interest.“130	  By	  simultaneously	  hosting	  talks	  and	  developing	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  the	  USSR	  and	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  PRC,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  positioned	  themselves	  in	  such	  a	  place	  where	  both	  countries	  feared	  the	  U.S.	  would	  move	  into	  support	  for	  their	  adversary.	  This	  gave	  both	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  an	  incentive	  to	  work	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
What	  is	  most	  noteworthy	  about	  case	  is	  that	  the	  ‘rift’	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  served	  as	  a	  favorable	  condition	  to	  the	  Nixon	  Administration	  in	  their	  ultimate	  pursuit	  of	  détente	  as	  a	  more	  robust	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Had	  the	  border	  dispute	  in	  March	  of	  1969	  not	  taken	  place,	  one	  must	  wonder	  if	  the	  U.S.	  would	  have	  found	  a	  better	  (or	  even	  comparable)	  time	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  Chinese.	  
In	  conclusion,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  conditions	  of	  time	  were	  crucial	  in	  providing	  Nixon	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  détente.	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  domestic	  conditions,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  became	  a	  significant	  issue	  in	  the	  American	  political	  discourse	  particularly	  during	  the	  1968	  Presidential	  Elections.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  soon	  after	  Johnson’s	  reelection	  in	  1964,	  he	  began	  facing	  domestic	  and	  international	  disapproval	  due	  to	  his	  handling	  of	  the	  war.	  Johnson	  later	  decided	  against	  running	  for	  a	  second	  full	  term.	  The	  Vietnam	  War	  essentially	  served	  as	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  containment,	  which	  had	  dominated	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  for	  the	  nearly	  twenty	  years	  preceding	  the	  Nixon	  presidency.	  Former	  Vice	  President	  Nixon,	  who	  had	  been	  out	  of	  politics	  since	  his	  failed	  1960	  presidential	  campaign,	  saw	  an	  opening	  and	  began	  mounting	  a	  serious	  
	  	   	  71	  campaign	  after	  the	  increasing	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  the	  general	  disconnect	  of	  the	  American	  public.	  Nixon	  recognized	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  containment	  was	  not	  working,	  the	  country	  had	  little	  foreign	  support	  (in	  addition	  to	  being	  in	  debt),	  and	  a	  new	  strategy	  was	  needed.	  After	  running	  a	  campaign	  focused	  on	  calling	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  as	  well	  as	  addressing	  domestic	  issues	  dividing	  the	  country,	  Nixon	  won	  the	  1968	  presidential	  election.	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  his	  promise	  in	  changing	  the	  course	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  Nixon	  pursued	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  The	  policy	  of	  détente	  allowed	  the	  United	  States	  to	  uphold	  its	  interests	  without	  resorting	  to	  war.	  These	  specific	  interests	  were	  outlined	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Nixon	  Doctrine”,	  which	  made	  three	  important	  proclamations:	  First,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  honor	  their	  existing	  treaty	  agreements.	  Second,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  provide	  a	  nuclear	  umbrella	  to	  their	  allies	  and	  other	  such	  countries	  deemed	  vital	  to	  U.S.	  national	  security.	  And	  third,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  help	  supply	  arms	  and	  aid	  in	  the	  development	  of	  their	  allies,	  but	  would	  not	  be	  dragged	  into	  taking	  upon	  themselves	  the	  responsibility	  of	  personally	  defending	  every	  nation	  that	  became	  involved	  in	  armed	  conflict.131	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  international	  conditions	  that	  allowed	  Nixon	  to	  initially	  pursue	  détente,	  I	  would	  first	  argue	  that	  the	  Kennedy	  Administration	  paved	  the	  way	  for	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  Richard	  Nixon:	  "Address	  to	  the	  Nation	  on	  the	  War	  in	  Vietnam,"	  November	  3,	  1969.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  (Accessed	  May	  1,	  2016)	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303.	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I.	  Factor	  1:	  General	  Public	  Focused	  Primarily	  on	  Domestic	  Policy	  
The	  first	  factor	  I	  argue	  that	  contributed	  to	  Nixon’s	  success	  in	  pursuing	  détente	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  domestic	  conditions	  were	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  general	  public	  was	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  policy,	  which	  created	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Nixon	  to	  shift	  to	  a	  drastically	  different	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  with	  minimal	  public	  backlash.	  
As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  during	  the	  1968	  presidential	  elections	  coincided	  with	  the	  American	  public’s	  increasing	  anger	  and	  frustration	  over	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  Nixon,	  considering	  another	  run	  for	  president,	  believed	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  disaster	  might	  be	  enough	  to	  get	  a	  Republican	  elected	  to	  the	  White	  House.132	  Interestingly,	  although	  Nixon	  was	  widely	  seen	  as	  the	  “foreign	  policy	  expert”	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  he	  was	  advised	  to	  soften	  his	  stance	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War.133	  After	  all,	  Nixon	  had	  served	  eight	  years	  as	  Vice	  President	  in	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration,	  which	  pursued	  the	  policy	  of	  containment.	  As	  a	  result,	  Nixon’s	  1968	  presidential	  campaign	  was	  very	  much	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  bringing	  Americans	  together	  through	  the	  emphasis	  of	  focusing	  on	  domestic	  political	  issues.	  For	  example,	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  Parmet,	  Herbert	  S.	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  His	  America.	  Little,	  Brown,	  1990.	  502.	  133	  Novak,	  Robert;	  Evans,	  Rowland,	  "Nixon	  Firm	  in	  Vietnam	  Stand",	  The	  Free-­‐Lance	  
Star	  (Fredericksburg,	  Virginia,	  1967),	  p.	  3	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  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  one	  issue	  included	  putting	  a	  stop	  to	  increasing	  rampant	  crime.134	  
Due	  to	  such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  domestic	  unrest	  –	  including	  two	  high-­‐profile	  assassinations	  and	  widespread	  urban	  riots	  –	  Nixon	  was	  given	  more	  freedom	  to	  pursue	  a	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  that	  would	  certainly	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  drastic	  change.	  Undoubtedly,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  détente	  was	  also	  more	  palatable	  to	  the	  general	  public	  because	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  containment,	  which	  was	  the	  policy	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  involvement	  in	  Vietnam.	  
	  
II.	  Factor	  2:	  International	  Conditions	  Allowing	  for	  a	  Change	  in	  
Foreign	  Policy	  
	   The	  second	  factor	  I	  argue	  that	  contributed	  to	  Nixon’s	  success	  in	  pursuing	  détente	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  international	  conditions	  were	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  allowed	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  President	  Kennedy’s	  handling	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  created	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  1969	  border	  dispute	  between	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  created	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  China.	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  Black,	  Conrad.	  Richard	  M.	  Nixon:	  A	  Life	  in	  Full.	  PublicAffairs,	  2008.	  550.	  
	  	   	  76	  In	  the	  case	  of	  President	  Kennedy’s	  during	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis,	  I	  argue	  that	  Kennedy’s	  handling	  of	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  opened	  up	  a	  line	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  that	  previously	  had	  existed.	  Specifically,	  this	  “line	  of	  communication”	  I	  speak	  of	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  “channel”	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  Indeed,	  the	  “channel”	  was	  essential	  to	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  allowed	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  Leadership	  to	  handle	  their	  negotiations	  in	  a	  careful	  and	  cautious	  way	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  give	  each	  side	  the	  opportunity	  to	  informally	  study	  the	  other’s	  way	  of	  thinking.135	  As	  is	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  Kennedy’s	  approach	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  friendship	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  it	  did	  show	  the	  potential	  for	  American	  and	  Soviet	  cooperation.	  
	   In	  the	  case	  of	  pursuing	  détente	  with	  China,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  border	  dispute	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Chinese	  along	  the	  Ussuri	  River	  created	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  pursue	  détente	  with	  China.	  As	  Kissinger	  writes,	  “Soviet	  military	  intervention	  in	  China	  would	  signal	  the	  most	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  global	  balance	  of	  power	  since	  the	  Cuban	  missile	  crisis.”136	  Nixon	  saw	  this	  border	  dispute	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  drive	  a	  wedge	  between	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Chinese	  in	  order	  to	  modify	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  dialogue.	  Indeed,	  this	  dialogue	  was	  ultimately	  utilized	  to	  transform	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States,	  China,	  and	  the	  Soviet	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  Kissinger,	  Diplomacy.	  705.	  136	  Kissinger,	  Diplomacy.	  722.	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  Union.	  Had	  this	  border	  dispute	  not	  occurred,	  Nixon	  arguably	  would	  not	  have	  found	  an	  appropriate	  time	  to	  initiate	  a	  dialogue	  with	  the	  Chinese.	  
	  
III.	  Factor	  3:	  Utilizing	  “Informal	  Powers”	  to	  Influence	  Public	  
Opinion	  
The	  third	  factor	  I	  argue	  that	  contributed	  to	  Nixon’s	  success	  in	  pursuing	  détente	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Nixon	  was	  personally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  “informal	  powers”	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  take	  leadership	  over	  public	  opinion.	  This	  third	  factor	  that	  I	  have	  introduced	  touches	  on	  a	  number	  of	  themes	  from	  Chapter	  1.	  First,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  Nixon’s	  actions	  fit	  within	  the	  “informal	  powers”	  framework	  of	  Snow,	  specifically	  the	  latter’s	  claims	  about	  presidential	  leadership	  in	  public	  opinion.	  Nonetheless,	  Nixon’s	  ability	  to	  use	  these	  informal	  powers	  in	  the	  way	  he	  did	  relied	  upon	  his	  own	  ability	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  his	  skills	  and	  background	  in	  crafting	  a	  public	  image	  that	  could	  lead	  public	  opinion	  on	  détente.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  second	  point	  that	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  détente	  falls	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  Neustadt’s	  argument	  that	  a	  president	  must	  utilize	  his	  power	  to	  persuade	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  his	  influence.	  	  
	   Beginning	  with	  the	  Donald	  Snow	  piece,	  he	  separates	  presidential	  power	  into	  two	  separate	  categories:	  formal	  powers	  and	  informal	  powers.	  Formal	  powers	  
	  	   	  78	  include	  allocated	  authorities	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  nominate	  key	  personal	  and	  recognize	  foreign	  regimes,	  in	  addition	  to	  possessing	  a	  variety	  of	  formal	  titles,	  such	  as	  “Head	  of	  State,”	  which	  provides	  the	  president	  with	  “symbolic	  personification.”	  In	  analyzing	  my	  case	  study,	  however,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Snow’s	  so-­‐called	  “informal	  powers”	  of	  the	  presidency	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  beneficial	  to	  Nixon	  and	  his	  ambitious	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  than	  the	  “formal	  powers.”	  	  Snow’s	  “informal	  powers”	  include	  the	  following:	  “presidential	  singularity”,	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  through	  media	  access,	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership,	  and	  “president	  doctrines.”	  	  
In	  the	  four	  examples	  of	  informal	  powers	  provided	  by	  Snow,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  two	  of	  them,	  including	  the	  president’s	  ability	  to	  shape	  public	  opinion	  through	  media	  access	  and	  the	  president’s	  role	  in	  world	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership,	  often	  intertwined	  in	  Nixon’s	  case	  and	  presented	  him	  with	  meaningful	  opportunities	  that	  he	  capitalized	  on.	  In	  terms	  of	  media	  access,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  then-­‐presidential	  candidate	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  was	  considered	  by	  viewers	  to	  have	  won	  the	  first	  televised	  presidential	  debate	  in	  American	  History	  between	  himself	  and	  Richard	  Nixon	  in	  thanks	  to	  the	  coolness	  and	  confidence	  he	  exuded.137	  Though	  one	  can	  not	  know	  what	  was	  going	  to	  Nixon’s	  head	  in	  the	  nearly	  8	  years	  from	  the	  time	  of	  that	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  79	  televised	  debate	  to	  the	  launching	  of	  his	  1968	  president	  campaign,	  I	  would	  first	  argue	  that	  Nixon	  not	  only	  understood	  the	  value	  of	  public	  perception	  nearly	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  televised	  debate,	  but	  he	  also	  demonstrated	  through	  his	  actions	  that	  he	  valued	  public	  opinion.	  In	  particular,	  public	  opinion	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  influence	  on	  Nixon	  when	  one	  considers	  how	  he	  adjusted	  his	  foreign	  policy	  positions	  during	  the	  1968	  president	  campaign.	  	  
Many	  scholars	  have	  noted	  the	  role	  of	  public	  opinion	  as	  a	  presidential	  constraint.	  Mayhew	  has	  suggested	  that	  politicians	  are	  motivated	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  sustain	  an	  electoral	  constituency,138	  and	  there	  are	  clear	  indications	  that	  Nixon	  acted	  in	  such	  a	  fashion.	  One	  specific	  example	  would	  include	  Nixon’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  policy	  to	  withdraw	  troops	  from	  the	  enormously	  unpopular	  Vietnam	  War.	  Certainly,	  this	  was	  a	  position	  that	  deeply	  resonated	  with	  the	  general	  public	  at	  the	  time.	  
Nixon’s	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  ongoing	  failure	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  was	  certainly	  uncharacteristic	  of	  him	  at	  the	  time,	  considering	  the	  reputation	  he	  had	  previously	  built	  for	  being	  a	  staunch	  anti-­‐communist.	  Furthermore,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Nixon’s	  adjustment	  on	  this	  particular	  policy	  position	  demonstrated	  his	  willingness	  and	  keen	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  a	  strong	  public	  image,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  have	  brought	  him	  to	  the	  point	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Thomas,	  Paul	  G.	  "David	  R.	  Mayhew,	  Congress:	  The	  Electoral	  Connection.	  New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1974,	  pp.	  vii,	  194."	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  9,	  no.	  01	  (1976):	  161-­‐162.	  
	  	   	  80	  maintaining	  favorability	  with	  the	  general	  public	  was	  more	  important	  to	  him	  that	  preserving	  a	  particular	  ideological	  belief.	  Perhaps	  this	  tells	  us	  that	  in	  Nixon’s	  case,	  an	  overwhelmingly	  populist	  position	  or	  maybe	  even	  just	  a	  majority	  ‘consensus’	  of	  discontent	  among	  the	  general	  public)	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  way	  presidents	  pursue	  (or	  don’t	  pursue)	  a	  particular	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  	  
Nonetheless	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  regard	  Nixon	  as	  only	  reacting	  to	  public	  opinion.	  As	  Snow	  suggested	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  presidential	  power,	  the	  President’s	  “informal	  powers”	  extend	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  public	  opinion.	  However,	  along	  with	  that	  particular	  ability,	  would	  are	  that	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  détente	  demonstrates	  that	  Presidents	  who	  know	  how	  to	  effectively	  utilize	  their	  “informal	  powers”,	  such	  the	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  they	  gain	  due	  to	  their	  role	  in	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership,	  are	  better	  position	  to	  engage	  in	  significant	  foreign	  policy	  endeavors.	  In	  Nixon’s	  case,	  it	  involved	  dramatically	  shifting	  the	  direction	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  will	  provide	  examples	  of	  how	  a	  few	  of	  Snow’s	  so-­‐called	  informal	  powers	  aided	  Nixon	  in	  his	  pursuit	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China.	  
	   As	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  power	  a	  president	  enjoys	  in	  maintaining	  a	  prominent	  global	  presence	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership	  increases	  his	  sheer	  visibility	  and	  adds	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility	  to	  his	  public	  image.	  One	  photograph	  that	  fits	  that	  description	  would	  
	  	   	  81	  be	  the	  now-­‐infamous	  image	  of	  President	  Nixon	  shaking	  the	  hand	  of	  Chinese	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai	  shortly	  after	  landing	  in	  Beijing	  during	  his	  1972	  visit	  to	  China.	  Indeed,	  Nixon	  knew	  exactly	  how	  momentous	  this	  occasion	  would	  be	  not	  only	  for	  himself	  and	  his	  perceived	  leadership	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  for	  the	  future	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Nixon	  wanted	  his	  visit	  to	  China	  to	  be	  heavily	  publicized,	  which	  is	  why	  his	  plane	  was	  carefully	  planned	  to	  land	  in	  Beijing	  at	  11:30am,	  so	  the	  occasion	  could	  be	  broadcast	  on	  primetime	  television	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  10:30pm	  Eastern	  standard	  time.139	  
	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  power	  a	  president	  yields	  in	  maintaining	  a	  prominent	  global	  presence	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  world	  leadership,	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  the	  era	  of	  détente	  arguably	  represent	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  how	  a	  president’s	  impact	  in	  international	  diplomatic	  and	  world	  leadership	  efforts	  can	  have	  a	  lasting	  and	  important	  impact	  on	  their	  legacy.	  An	  example	  of	  that	  directly	  relates	  with	  the	  last	  of	  Snow’s	  informal	  powers	  that	  I	  will	  briefly	  engage	  with:	  “presidential	  doctrines.”	  
Snow	  includes	  “presidential	  doctrines”	  as	  an	  informal	  power	  of	  the	  presidency,	  and	  defines	  this	  power	  as	  “the	  president’s	  ability	  to	  put	  his	  distinctive	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  stamp	  on	  policy	  by	  unilaterally	  proclaiming	  doctrines	  bearing	  his	  name.”140	  As	  is	  noted	  Ch.	  1	  in	  the	  provided	  example	  of	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine”,	  many	  presidents	  had	  (and	  continue	  to	  have)	  their	  own	  doctrines.	  These	  doctrines	  remain	  historically	  significant	  not	  only	  when	  studying	  respective	  presidential	  legacies,	  but	  also	  in	  understanding	  the	  dynamics	  and	  evolution	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Due	  to	  this,	  the	  idea	  of	  “presidential	  doctrines”	  as	  an	  informal	  power	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  my	  case	  study	  of	  Nixon	  and	  the	  era	  of	  détente.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  pillars	  of	  Nixon’s	  legacy	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Nixon	  Doctrine.”	  The	  Nixon	  Doctrine	  made	  three	  important	  (and	  previously	  mentioned)	  proclamations,	  which	  allowed	  the	  U.S.	  to	  continue	  pursuing	  its	  agenda	  without	  resorting	  to	  war.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine	  was	  particularly	  significant	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  its	  introduction.	  As	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine	  was	  intended	  to	  shift	  the	  course	  of	  American	  policy	  strategy	  away	  from	  the	  prevailing	  “policy	  of	  containment.”	  
The	  power	  Nixon	  exuded	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  his	  doctrine	  fits	  in	  remarkably	  close	  with	  Snow’s	  characterization	  of	  how	  presidential	  doctrines	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  source	  of	  power.	  Just	  like	  the	  example	  of	  President	  Truman	  and	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  and	  now	  with	  the	  case	  of	  President	  Nixon	  and	  the	  Nixon	  Doctrine,	  these	  men	  succeeded	  in	  exemplifying	  this	  informal	  power.	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  83	  My	  argument	  that	  Nixon’s	  informal	  powers	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  beneficial	  than	  his	  formal	  powers	  is	  rooted	  in	  my	  argument	  that	  Nixon’s	  “informal	  powers”	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  his	  ability	  to	  persuade.	  However	  Nixon’s	  ability	  to	  persuade,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  theme	  of	  the	  Richard	  Neustadt	  piece,	  must	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Nixon’s	  somewhat	  unique	  ability	  to	  exercise	  public	  opinion	  leadership	  in	  this	  area.	  	  
Comparable	  to	  Snow’s	  “informal	  powers”	  and	  the	  different	  forms	  they	  come	  in,	  the	  power	  to	  persuade	  can	  certainly	  be	  tactfully	  utilized	  by	  a	  skilled	  president	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  outlets	  mentioned	  by	  Snow.	  On	  the	  “power	  to	  persuade”,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  one’s	  ability	  to	  exercise	  power	  and	  influence	  is	  dependent	  upon	  their	  character	  and	  reputation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  his	  political	  background	  as	  a	  leading	  anti-­‐communist	  (which	  is	  highlighted	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  project),	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  he	  was	  positioned	  in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  convey	  to	  the	  American	  people	  that	  détente	  was	  the	  right	  strategy	  to	  pursue.	  Had	  a	  ‘softer’	  politician	  initiated	  the	  policy	  of	  détente,	  I	  would	  argue	  they	  would	  not	  have	  been	  in	  a	  position	  to	  gain	  the	  amount	  of	  legitimacy	  or	  credibility	  necessary	  to	  pursue	  a	  drastic	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  due	  to	  Democratic	  President	  Johnson’s	  tremendously	  unpopular	  Vietnam	  War.	  
Richard	  Nixon	  was	  no	  ordinary	  staunch	  anti-­‐communist,	  but	  rather,	  when	  considering	  his	  background	  mention	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  project,	  I	  would	  
	  	   	  84	  argue	  that	  Nixon’s	  identity	  as	  one	  of	  America’s	  leading	  anti-­‐communist	  voices	  in	  American	  politics	  provided	  him	  with	  a	  unique	  (if	  not	  ideal)	  platform	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  pursuing	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  –	  a	  policy	  that	  many	  of	  its	  critics	  viewed	  as	  appeasement	  to	  the	  Communists,	  certainly	  required	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  messenger	  –	  one	  with	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  –	  to	  persuade	  congress	  and	  the	  American	  people	  that	  seeking	  to	  ease	  tensions	  and	  work	  diplomatically	  with	  the	  world’s	  leading	  communist	  superpower	  was	  the	  right	  course	  for	  America	  to	  take.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  number	  of	  key	  moments	  positioned	  Nixon	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  he	  later	  had	  the	  unique	  authority,	  and	  thus	  persuasive	  ability,	  to	  champion	  the	  policy	  of	  détente.	  These	  moments	  in	  his	  career	  include	  serving	  on	  the	  communism-­‐busting	  House	  Un-­‐American	  Activities	  Committee	  (HUAC)	  and	  his	  highly	  visible	  role	  in	  the	  Alger	  Hiss	  case,	  which	  was	  outlined	  in	  the	  introduction.	  In	  terms	  of	  needing	  a	  ‘unique	  messenger’	  to	  champion	  the	  policy	  of	  détente,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  strong	  example	  of	  someone	  who	  could	  not	  have	  effectively	  pursued	  a	  change	  of	  course	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  would	  be	  Nixon’s	  democratic	  challenger	  in	  the	  1968	  presidential	  election,	  Vice	  President	  Hubert	  Humphrey.	  Due	  to	  the	  ongoing	  blunder	  in	  Vietnam	  that	  his	  boss,	  President	  Johnson,	  continued	  to	  get	  the	  U.S.	  more	  and	  more	  entangled	  in,	  Humphrey’s	  foreign	  policy	  credentials	  were	  largely	  tattered.	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  as	  in	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  Nixon	  campaign	  portrayed	  Humphrey	  as	  “soft	  of	  communism.”	  It	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  imagine	  a	  candidate	  gaining	  the	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  sufficient	  about	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  drastically	  alter	  American	  foreign	  policy	  when	  the	  popularity	  of	  his	  boss	  (the	  President)	  and	  his	  political	  party	  steadily	  grew	  more	  and	  more	  unpopular.	  	  
	  This	  idea	  of	  Nixon’s	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility	  being	  sufficient	  enough	  to	  pursue	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  relates	  to	  another	  one	  of	  Neustadt’s	  arguments	  about	  a	  president’s	  “status.”	  On	  his	  argument	  about	  presidential	  power	  being	  the	  power	  to	  persuade,	  Neustadt	  writes,	  “despite	  his	  status	  [the	  president]	  does	  not	  get	  action	  without	  argument.”141	  Furthermore,	  because	  Neustadt	  believes	  the	  president	  is	  actually	  a	  relatively	  weak	  figure	  in	  the	  U.S.	  government	  (in	  terms	  of	  having	  the	  autonomy	  to	  pursue	  his	  agenda	  without	  opposition	  or	  resistance),	  he	  must	  do	  the	  following	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  his	  influence:	  he	  must	  do	  the	  following	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  his	  influence:	  	  
“Effective	  influence	  for	  the	  man	  in	  the	  White	  House	  stems	  from	  three	  related	  sources:	  first	  are	  the	  bargaining	  advantages	  inherent	  in	  his	  job	  with	  which	  to	  persuade	  other	  men	  that	  what	  he	  wants	  of	  them	  in	  what	  their	   own	   responsibilities	   require	   them	   to	   do.	   Second	   are	   the	  expectations	  of	   those	  other	  men	  regarding	  his	  ability	  and	  will	   to	  use	  the	   various	   advantages	   they	   think	   he	   has.	   Third	   are	   those	   men’s	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  Neustadt,	  Richard	  E.	  Presidential	  Power	  and	  the	  Modern	  Presidents:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Leadership	  from	  
Roosevelt	  to	  Reagan.	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1991.	  11.	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  estimates	  of	  how	  his	  public	  views	  him	  and	  how	  their	  publics	  may	  view	  them	  if	  they	  do	  what	  he	  wants.”142	  
In	  other	  words,	  Neustadt	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  pursue	  and	  implement	  his	  agenda,	  the	  president	  must	  utilize	  his	  persuasive	  skills,	  maintain	  a	  solid	  reputation,	  and	  protect	  and	  enhance	  his	  perceived	  public	  image.	  	  
Crucially	  for	  Neustadt,	  the	  President’s	  ability	  to	  act	  is	  tied	  other	  actors’	  perception	  of	  him.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  Neustadt	  writes	  that	  the	  “President’s	  authority	  and	  status	  give	  him	  great	  advantages	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  men	  he	  would	  persuade.”143	  This	  “authority”,	  I	  would	  argue,	  includes	  a	  type	  of	  ‘aura’,	  or	  “legitimacy”	  as	  previously	  described,	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  not	  associated	  with	  the	  office	  alone.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  president	  first	  requires	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility,	  which,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon,	  was	  a	  result	  of	  both	  his	  own	  personal	  background	  as	  well	  as	  the	  background	  of	  his	  national	  security	  advisor-­‐turned-­‐Secretary	  of	  State,	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  who	  had	  earned	  his	  credibility	  in	  Republican	  circles	  not	  only	  as	  a	  well-­‐respected	  and	  innovative	  academic,	  but	  also	  and	  as	  an	  advisor	  on	  the	  1960,	  1964,	  and	  1968	  presidential	  campaigns	  of	  then-­‐Governor	  of	  New	  York,	  Nelson	  Rockefeller.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  Kissinger	  added	  ‘gravitas’	  to	  Nixon’s	  legitimacy	  and	  credibility,	  which	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  Ibid.	  150.	  143	  Ibid.	  30.	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  made	  it	  possible	  for	  him	  to	  pursue	  this	  drastic	  change	  in	  American	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  	  
	  
IV.	  Factor	  4:	  Assuming	  Office	  at	  the	  Time	  of	  a	  Failing	  Regime	  
The	  fourth	  factor	  I	  argue	  that	  contributed	  to	  Nixon’s	  success	  in	  pursuing	  détente	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  assumed	  office	  at	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  a	  previous	  ‘regime’	  of	  foreign	  policy	  was	  failing.	  This	  fourth	  factor	  strongly	  relates	  to	  the	  Skowronek	  piece.	  
In	  Presidential	  Leadership	  in	  Political	  Time,	  Skowronek	  argues	  that	  regardless	  of	  a	  president’s	  power,	  he	  is	  still	  restrained	  by	  broad	  structural	  factors	  that	  are	  more	  often	  than	  not	  out	  of	  their	  control.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  three	  previous	  scholars,	  Skowronek’s	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  presidential	  power	  throughout	  time	  and	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  powers	  follow	  larger	  patterns	  throughout	  “political	  time.”	  	  
	   Although	  Skowronek	  certainly	  acknowledges	  that	  presidents	  can	  achieve	  change,	  this	  change	  is	  not	  something	  achieved	  simply	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  power	  utilized	  or	  amount	  of	  charisma	  possessed	  by	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief.	  Skowronek	  argues	  that	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  a	  president	  faces	  when	  seeking	  to	  legitimize	  his	  actions	  or	  instigate	  change	  is	  where	  that	  particular	  president	  falls	  in	  relation	  to	  
	  	   	  88	  the	  broader	  political	  cycle	  throughout	  time.	  This	  cycle	  includes	  variables	  such	  as	  the	  style,	  successes,	  and	  failures	  of	  the	  previous	  president,	  as	  well	  as	  political	  patterns	  preceding	  them.	  It	  is	  this	  analysis	  of	  Skowronek’s	  that	  I	  would	  argue	  has	  a	  relevant	  connection	  to	  Nixon	  and	  his	  pursuit	  of	  détente.	  
	   Skowronek	  focuses	  on	  how	  presidents	  fall	  within	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  “party	  regimes”	  and	  how	  a	  president’s	  style	  and	  ability	  to	  afflict	  change	  is	  greatly	  dependent	  on	  upon	  timing.	  Indeed,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  analysis	  is	  also	  applicable	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  détente.	  Just	  as	  Skowronek	  writes	  about	  “party	  regimes”,	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  ‘regimes’	  that	  exist	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  And	  as	  previously	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  arrived	  at	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  20-­‐year	  long	  period	  of	  ‘containment’	  failure.	  Skowronek	  argues	  that	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  president	  to	  present	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  politics	  occurs	  when	  party	  regimes	  fail,	  and	  I	  would	  argue	  the	  same	  principle	  applies	  to	  foreign	  policy	  regimes.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  would	  be	  when	  we	  saw	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  replace	  the	  policy	  of	  containment.	  Due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  containment,	  Nixon	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  create	  a	  new	  ‘regime’	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  at	  the	  end	  of	  what	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  failing	  ‘regime.’	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  president	  has	  the	  option	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  ‘regime’	  when	  he	  enters	  office	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  failing	  regime.	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Conclusion	  	  	  
This	  project	  has	  analyzed	  the	  role	  and	  limits	  of	  the	  presidential	  policy-­‐making	  in	  foreign	  policy	  through	  an	  examination	  of	  President	  Richard	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  détente	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  during	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  I	  have	  provided	  evidence	  for	  the	  four	  factors	  that	  played	  a	  role	  in	  enabling	  Nixon	  to	  pursue	  to	  policy	  of	  détente.	  Backed	  up	  by	  the	  research	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3,	  the	  four	  consequential	  factors	  included	  the	  following:	  First,	  when	  domestic	  conditions	  exist	  in	  which	  the	  general	  public	  is	  focused	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  policy.	  Second,	  when	  the	  existing	  international	  conditions	  allow	  for	  a	  change	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  Third,	  when	  a	  president	  is	  personally	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  “informal	  powers”	  of	  the	  presidency	  and	  take	  leadership	  over	  public	  opinion.	  And	  fourth,	  when	  a	  president	  assumes	  office	  at	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  a	  previous	  “regime”	  of	  foreign	  policy	  is	  failing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  leading	  scholarly	  discussions	  and	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  topic	  of	  presidential	  power	  and	  decision-­‐making	  abilities,	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  era	  of	  détente	  has	  most	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  writings	  of	  Snow,	  Neustadt,	  and	  Skowronek.	  However,	  this	  case	  study	  still	  contributes	  a	  meaningful	  discussion	  on	  the	  Schlesinger	  piece.	  
	  	   	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Schlesinger’s	  argument	  in	  The	  Imperial	  Presidency	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  when	  analyzing	  it	  through	  a	  lens	  focusing	  on	  Nixon	  and	  the	  era	  of	  détente.	  Schlesinger	  argues	  that	  the	  leading	  cause	  of	  the	  imperial	  presidency	  stems	  from	  issues	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  newly	  acquired	  war	  powers.	  These	  war	  powers,	  Schlesinger	  argues,	  have	  increased	  since	  the	  United	  States	  became	  a	  global	  superpower,	  and	  continue	  to	  increase	  through	  times	  of	  war.	  A	  large	  part	  of	  Schlesinger’s	  argument	  is	  that	  Nixon	  and	  Johnson	  got	  away	  with	  egregious	  offenses	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  arena	  because	  the	  institutions	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  have	  restrained	  them	  domestically	  were	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  presents	  an	  interesting	  question:	  Could	  Nixon	  have	  pursued	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  at	  the	  time	  he	  did	  if	  his	  presidential	  power	  had	  been	  more	  restrained?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  détente	  through	  the	  “channel,”	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  Nixon’s	  presidential	  powers	  were	  not	  constrained.	  However,	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  domestic	  and	  international	  conditions	  of	  the	  time	  empowered	  him	  to	  pursue	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  foreign	  policy	  strategy.	  Speaking	  on	  Nixon’s	  approach	  of	  détente	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China,	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  even	  if	  Nixon	  were	  more	  autonomous	  than	  Schlesinger	  believes	  he	  should	  have	  been,	  it	  was	  ultimately	  not	  a	  bad	  thing.	  In	  hindsight,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  had	  the	  U.S.	  pursued	  a	  strategy	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  John	  Dulles,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  security	  of	  United	  States	  would	  have	  been	  more	  uncertain.	  These	  security	  concerns	  would	  have	  been	  even	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  more	  pressing	  considering	  the	  ongoing	  nuclear	  arms	  race	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  technological	  advances	  in	  warfare,	  which	  occurred	  around	  the	  time	  President	  Kennedy	  was	  sworn	  into	  office	  and	  are	  described	  in	  Chapter	  2	  of	  this	  project.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Undoubtedly,	  the	  fall	  of	  Nixon	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  “imperial	  presidency”,	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  presidential	  oversight.	  However,	  as	  I	  believe	  the	  case	  of	  Nixon	  and	  his	  pursuit	  of	  the	  policy	  of	  détente	  demonstrates,	  even	  if	  a	  president	  operates	  in	  an	  ‘imperial’	  or	  undemocratic	  fashion,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  his	  actions	  will	  inevitably	  result	  in	  a	  more	  unstable	  or	  insecure	  domestic	  and	  international	  environment.	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